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COMMENT
The Marriage of Intellectual Property and
International Trade in the TRIPs Agreement:




Intellectual property rights (IPRs)' have been protected
in international conventions since the nineteenth century.2
t J.D. candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, 1999;
B.A., Georgetown University, 1990. I would like to thank Professor Makau Wa
Mutua for thoughtful guidance and insight in helping to select and focus this
topic. Special appreciation is offered to Lilia for allowing this project to matter
as much to her as it did to me. Seriemien nia bu Alane.
1. Intellectual property has been defined as information with a commercial
value. Intellectual property rights, in turn, have been referred to as the public
willingness to bestow the status of property on ideas, inventions and creative
expressions. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 11 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, March
20, 1883, last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, last revised at Stockholm, July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. See discussion infra
Part I.A. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are even much older than these
international conventions. Patents were used as early as the fourteenth century
by English monarchs to protect the knowledge gained from foreign craftsman
who had been imported in order to advance domestic technology. See GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY at
v (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS]. In
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While we commonly think of intellectual property (IP) in
terms of modem high-tech ingenuity, the recognition of
IPRs is, in fact, quite old. What is new is the recently
positioned legal prominence of IP in international economic
relations. In 1994, the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) significantly al-
tered the global IP paradigm through the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs).' For over a century, the Paris Convention of 1883
and the Berne Convention of 1886, the major pre-TRIPs
international IP agreements, were perceived to adequately
protect IP among member nations. Then something
changed. In the late twentieth century, Western developed
nations recognized the increasing volume and importance of
IP in international trade. TRIPs emerged in response to
this shift in the economic importance of IP, repositioning
the relevance and legal status of IP in the context of trade.
Prior to TRIPs, IPRs were afforded isolated and essentially
voluntary international legal protection under the Paris
and Berne Conventions.4 TRIPs changes all this. By placing
IP within the rubric of international trade agreements, na-
tions now may protect IP through trade sanctions against
sum, intellectual property (IP) laws and agreements in developed economies
were "propelled by local lobbyists, to protect and enhance local trade interests
against piracy and also as a form of patronage and censorship." BANKOLE
SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
25 (1997). Sodipo even suggests that "many preliterate societies recognised and
protected intangible rights in ways which bear some semblance to the
intellectual property system." Id. at xxxv, 37-50 (discussing the recognition and
protection of proprietary rights in intangibles in preliterate societies). See
generally Mark C. Suchman, Invention and Ritual: Notes on the Interrelation of
Magic and Intellectual Property in Preliterate Societies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1264
(1989).
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. TRIPs establishes
standards concerning the availability, scope and use of eight categories of
intellectual property: copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs (topographies) of
integrated circuits, protection of undisclosed information, and control of anti-
competitive practices in contractual licenses. Id. For a succinct overview of each
type of intellectual property, see Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic
Implications, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES at 383
(Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995).
4. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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infringing countries. The Paris and Berne Conventions had
no effective means to ensure compliance, whereas GATT's
centrality to modern economic life requires nations to com-
ply with its provisions-now including IP-or risk economic
isolation.
This recent marriage of IP and trade has profound and
hotly contested global implications. Critics of TRIPs, in-
cluding many developing countries, have argued that
stronger international protection of intellectual property
will benefit only those countries which produce the greatest
amounts of IP-namely Western developed nations. Others
maintain that developing countries will ultimately profit
from increased IP protection due to incentives it will create
for domestic creativity and foreign investment.6 This Com-
ment argues that early evidence indicates TRIPs is indeed
successfully stimulating increased global IP protection
Developing countries are at the forefront of this revolution
and wisely elected to include TRIPs in the GATT regime.
The inextricable link between trade and IP today necessi-
tated a change in the global treatment of IPRs. TRIPs
provides a new and vital structure that can both protect IP
in the international order and, in part, stimulate develop-
ment in poorer nations.
Part I of this Comment looks at reasons for the dis-
satisfaction with the Paris and Berne Conventions and the
perceived need for TRIPs. Disparate results in two interna-
tional trademark disputes will illustrate a modern break-
down in the Paris-Berne model. Part II discusses provisions
in TRIPs that establish its dual role as a code of rules and a
forum for negotiation.' Consultations and negotiations facil-
itated by the World Trade Organization, as well as statu-
tory reforms and resulting case law from nations around
the world, forecast that TRIPs is more than a "paper tiger"
and, as such, is likely to succeed in increasing global imple-
mentation and enforcement of IPRs.
Part III considers whether developing countries stand
to benefit from protecting foreign, largely Western, IP.
10
Critics of international IP protection argue that Western
5. See discussion infra Part llI.B.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See discussion infra Part lI.A.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 16-60.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 61-167.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 168-217.
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"owners" of IP do not have a natural, human right to the
knowledge they create, but rather have co-opted the lang-
uage of natural rights as a proxy to justify their desire for
greater economic gain from increased IP protection. The
economic dichotomy between developing and developed
countries creates a conflict of rights with respect to IP be-
tween sovereign development on the one hand and global
protection of local property interests on the other. TRIPs
clearly pushes in favor of the latter.
While it is much too early to gauge conclusively the
effects of TRIPs on developing nations, Part IV suggests
that initial evidence indicates that substantial long-term
benefits will accrue to both the developed and the devel-
oping world." This Comment maintains that behind the
language of natural rights both Western industrialized
countries and developing nations have agreed to increased
IP protection because of two dispositive concerns: first, the
growing understanding of what each stands to gain from IP
protection; and, second, the particular historical juncture at
which this debate is occurring. Knowledge, particularly
technical knowledge, assumes a prominent role in modern
economic life. 2 The incredible rate of technological progress
combined with the increasing transparency of national bor-
ders makes protection of knowledge in the form of IPRs par-
ticularly important today.'3
The increasing link between trade and intellectual
property 4 has led many developing countries to recognize
that survival in a GATT-based world economy requires, in
part, recognition and protection of IP. Developing countries
have bargained for a graduated implementation of TRIPs
and will benefit from the protection afforded by the pro-
cesses of TRIPs' dispute resolution system. In isolation
11. See infra text accompanying notes 218-40.
12. Just twenty years ago both academics and business people looking at
international economic development focused their attention on foreign direct
investment. While this is still important, and in many ways is related to pro-
tection of IP, the role of knowledge itself-particularly technical knowledge-is
prominent in economic life today. Countries with weak intellectual property
systems clearly receive less technological knowledge. See John A. Armstrong,
Trends in Global Science and Technology and What they Mean for Intellectual
Property Systems, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 2, at 193, 205.
13. See generally GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 2.
14. "[Alt some level nearly all legitimately traded goods and services operate




IPRs may appear as abstract manifestations of a raw
individualism-the exclusive ownership of ideas.'5 Viewed in
the context of global interconnectedness as an incentive to
create, invest and trade, protection of IPRs is a prudent
development-enhancing strategy.
I. THE PRE-TRIPs SYSTEM
The history of IPRs is often overlooked when evaluating
their role and seeming ubiquity in modern world trade.
Today's widespread attention thrust on piracy of computer
software and entertainment media obscures the fact that
IPRs were well established in international conventions
over a century ago. 6 The law of intellectual property is not
a creature of the information age, despite its popular
association with modern, high-tech industry. Indeed the
Paris and Berne Conventions emerged at a time when
international agreements were being formed regarding
diverse concerns ranging from posts and telegraphs to
weights and measures to trade and customs. 7 The breadth
of historical international concern regarding IPRs is il-
lustrated by the range of countries which ratified the Paris
Convention by 1884: Belgium, Brazil, France, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador,
Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and the United King-
dom. The United States acceded to the convention three
15. One foundational document to the theory that intellectual property
rights are "natural rights" is the patent law adopted by the French
constitutional assembly at the time of the French revolution. Its preamble
stated that "every novel idea whose realization or development can become
useful to society belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and there would be
a violation of the rights of man in their very essence if an industrial invention
were not regarded as the property of its creator." See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 151 (1996). The United States Constitution is "thought to
enshrine this natural right." Id.
16. See generally Paris and Berne Conventions, supra note 2.
17. See Sam Ricketson, The Future of Traditional Intellectual Property
Conventions in the Brave New World of Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights, 26 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 872, 873 (1995). For
references to and discussion of the concern over the possible theft of ideas which
prompted the Paris and Berne Conventions, see Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of
Development, The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual Property and
Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315, 346 n.31 (1996).
18. Ricketson, supra note 17, at 875.
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years later. 9 Prior to this international union, only limited
bilateral treaties existed to protect foreign IP.
2
A. Provisions of the Paris and Berne Conventions
The Paris Convention protects industrial property, in-
cluding patents, utility models, industrial designs, trade-
marks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or
appellations of origin, and protects against unfair com-
petition."' The keystone of the Paris Convention is the
"national treatment" principle. National treatment prohi-
bits a country from providing less favorable treatment to
foreigners than to its own citizens with respect to IP laws.2
Article 2(1) provides:
Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of
the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or
may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the
. 23
rights specially provided for in this Convention.
For example, a French citizen with a patent registered
in the United States must receive the same treatment as
U.S. citizens with respect to the U.S. patent laws. This is
different from a system of "reciprocal treatment" which
affords protection only to the degree that one's citizens are
protected in another nation. 4 For example, under a reci-
procal treatment system an Argentinean citizen would only
receive patent protection in the United States to the degree
that U.S. citizens receive protection in Argentina.
The second important principle of the Paris Convention
is the "right of priority" established in Article 4. The right of
priority rule provides that any person who has duly filed an
19. Id.
20. See Harriet R. Freeman, Reshaping Trademark Protection in Today's
Global Village: Looking Beyond GATT's Uruguay Round Toward Global
Trademark Harmonization and Centralization, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 67,
73 (1995).
21. Paris Convention, supra note 2, art. 1(2). For a succinct overview of each
of these types of IP, see Braga, supra note 3.
22. Paris Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
23. Id.
24. See R. Carl Moy, The History of the Patent Harmonization Treaty:
Economic Self-Interest as an Influence, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 484-85
(1993) (explaining how the Paris Convention consciously selected national
treatment over the competing principle of reciprocity).
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application for a patent, a utility model, an industrial
design or a trademark in any member country, shall be
given a grace period in which to file in other countries.25 For
example, say Mr. Wisdo applies on October 1 to register a
trademark in Hungary and applies on October 15 to regis-
ter the same trademark in Costa Rica. Meanwhile, Ms.
Locario applies to register the same trademark on October 8
in Costa Rica. Mr. Wisdo, although he filed later than Ms.
Locario in Costa Rica, will be given a right of priority be-
cause of his prior application in another member country.26
Third, the Paris Convention promulgates certain mini-
mum standards of IP protection that member countries
must incorporate into national legislation.27 The main ob-
jective behind establishing uniform principles and mini-
mum guarantees is to eviscerate discrimination and assure
foreigners of equal treatment under the law in protection of
IPRs.
The Berne Convention provides broad copyright pro-
tection to "every production in the literary, scientific and
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression."29 Like the Paris Convention, the Berne Con-
vention provides for minimum standards such as granting
copyright protection for the life of the author plus fifty
years. The Berne Convention also adopts the central
principle of national treatment.3 Today, both conventions
are administered by the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United
25. Paris Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4A(1), 4C(1). The right of priority
rule extends for twelve months for patent and utility models and six months for
industrial designs and trademarks. During this time, any individual who has
filed in one member country can file in any other without fear of appropriation
of their IP. Id.
26. It is important to note that the right of priority does not mean that an
application filed in one member state is filed in all member states. Rather, it
means "that a date has been established throughout the membership should
any 'first-to-file' disputes arise." Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and
Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking,
19 U. PA. INT'L ECON. L. 535, 545 (1998).
27. Paris Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4-11.
28. See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National
Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 Am. U. J.
IN'I L. & POLY 769, 778-79 (1997).
29. Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(1).
30. See, e.g., id. art. 7(1) (granting copyright protection for the life of the
author plus fifty years).




B. Problems with the Paris and Berne Conventions
Despite the longevity and historical importance of these
WIPO Conventions, the end of the twentieth century has
wrought what has been called the "crisis in the Paris-Berne
regime."" Numerous criticisms have been levied against the
effectiveness of the Paris and Berne Conventions today.
When these conventions were written at the end of the
nineteenth century and even in their twentieth century
revisions, concerns regarding global connectedness and
harmonization of IP were not magnified, as they are today,
under the microscope of GATT and unprecedented increases
in trade. The present reality of a "global village" creates
problems that the WIPO Conventions are not equipped to
address.34 For example, the national treatment principle af-
fords protection only to the degree that a member country
protects its own citizens. Thus, inadequate IP laws in a
member country will not protect foreigners, particularly
when developing nations may desire weak IP laws."
Therefore, national treatment does not benefit foreigners in
states which fail to provide IP protection to their own
citizens.
This disharmony in IP laws among member nations
creates other problems, vividly illustrated through the fol-
lowing two trademark battles. In 1925, Article 6bis was
amended to the Paris Convention, requiring all member
nations to protect well-known trademarks belonging to citi-
zens of other Convention member countries. 6 Yet member
32. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 28, at 781. For information on the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), see generally <http//www.
wipo.org>.
33. Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace:
Impact of TRIPs Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAW. 99, 100 (1995).
34. See Freeman, supra note 20, at 75.
35. See id. at 74. Sometimes governments of developing nations condone-
explicitly or implicitly-unauthorized use of IP. One argument they put forward
is that knowledge is part of the public domain. More commonly they argue that
industries in developing economies cannot afford to pay royalties to the foreign
"owners" of IP. Therefore these industries utilize unauthorized IP in order to
survive the competition from the more advanced and economically strong
industries in industrialized nations. See GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 2, at
vi.




countries may each have their own standard for determin-
ing whether a trademark is well-known, 7 as demonstrated
by the much publicized South African case of McDonald's
Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant (Pty), Ltd.3" Prior
to the decision in McDonald's, the South African courts had
not protected the owners of foreign trademarks unless they
had "goodwill" in South Africa. 9 In McDonald's, the Amer-
ican fast food giant had registered its marks"° in South
Africa but had not used them due to concerns of the poten-
tial negative effect, stemming from criticisms of apartheid,
on its businesses elsewhere. ' Joburgers, a South African
fried chicken fast food chain, began using McDonald's
marks and applied to register them in its name.42
McDonald's filed suit for trademark infringement.
Despite McDonald's absence of goodwill in South Africa,
the Supreme Court of South Africa, Appellate Division, ex-
amined whether McDonald's marks were well-known in
South Africa.43 It evaluated whether a mark must be well-
known to all sectors of the population and what degree of
awareness is required to properly describe a mark as well-
known.' The court ultimately found that, to be well-known,
37. See Samantha D. Slotkin, Trademark Piracy in Latin America: A Case
Study on Reebok International, Ltd., 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 671, 681
(1996).
38. 1997 (1) SA 1 (A) (Supreme Court of South Africa, App. Div.) (on file
with the Buffalo Law Review). See generally Chris Job, The Infamous
McDonald's Case: What Really Happened, IP WORLDWIDE, May-June 1996, at
15, available in <http://vww.ipww.com/ may96/pl5infamous.html> (Mar. 10,
1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (discussing the trial court decision);
Stuart Gardner, McDonald's Triumphs in South Africa, IP WORLDWIDE,
Nov./Dec. 1996, at 15, available in <http:l/vw.ipww.com/nov96/p4mcdonald.
html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (discussing the
appellate court reversal and recognition of well-known foreign trademarks);
Charles E. Webster, South Africa: McDonald's Bites Back with Relish,
TRADEMARK WORLD, Oct. 1996, at 20; Appellate Court Vindicates McDonald's in
Trademark Dispute, 10 WoRLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 323 (1996).
39. See McDonald's, 1997 (1) SA 1 (A) at 19. Goodwill refers to the public's
favorable image, established through patronage, of a business' goods and
services.
40. The term "mark" includes any trademark, service mark, collective mark
or certification mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
41. See Naresh, supra note 36, at 565.
42. Id.
43. For an overview of the provisions of South Africa's Trade Marks Act No.
194 of 1993, including protection offered to internationally well-known marks in
accordance with the Paris Convention, see South Africa: Parliament Passes New
Trade Mark Act, 8 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 36 (1994).
44. McDonald's, 1997 (1) SA 1 (A) at 20.
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a mark must be known to a "general level of knowledge' 05 to
a "substantial number of persons."" Surprisingly, the court
looked to a market survey to measure the recognition of
McDonald's marks among the South African people."7 Not
only was the survey found to be instructive,48 but it was dis-
positive in establishing McDonald's marks as well-known. 9
McDonald's good fortune counterpoises Reebok's unfa-
vorable treatment in Peru which, like South Africa, is a
party to the Paris Convention." Reebok's battle to reclaim
its trademark in Peru through cancellation of a pirated reg-
istration lasted over ten years.5' Peru's trademark laws
seemingly lacked protection for well-known foreign marks,
or its standards were so vague as to preclude application to
Reebok. Generally, the right to protection of a well-known
mark has existed only on paper. Most parties to the Paris
Convention have not protected foreign marks until they
have been used locally, regardless of their international
fame.52
In March 1996, a new Peruvian trademark office in-
validated the registration of the REEBOK trademark by a
Peruvian company, Fabricas Unidas de Calzado S.A and
held that Reebok International was its rightful owner. The
Trademark Office declared that Peruvian consumers rec-
ognize the REEBOK mark; that Reebok International, Ltd.
engaged in considerable advertising and promotion in Peru;
that Fabricas Unidas de Calzado had acted in bad faith;
45. Id. at 23.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 24-25.
48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 28.
50. Note that the parties to the Paris Convention compose the Paris Union.
See Ryan, supra note 26, at 545; Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The United States
Proposal for a GATT Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
265, 269 (1989) (discussing that the parties to the Paris Convention constitute a
union but that the agreement does not explain what is meant by the term
"union").
51. See Jos6 Barreda, The Reebok Case in Peru: Ten Years and Counting,
TRADEMARK WORLD, May 1996, at 22; see also Slotkin, supra note 37, at 677.
52. See Naresh, supra note 36, at 564.
53. In 1996 Peru established a new Law of Industrial Property which
incorporated much of the TRIPs Agreement. See Adolfo Cadenillas Galvez,
Decree Changes Peru's Trademark Law, IP WORLDWIDE, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 23,
available in <http://www.ipww.com/mar97/p23decree.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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and that in accordance with the Pan American Convention
of Washington 1929, of which the U.S. and Peru are mem-
bers, Reebok International, Ltd. merited full protection of
its trade name.54 Nevertheless, Fabricas Unidas de Calzado
was able to obtain a court order to suspend the trademark
office's decision and the case was returned to the courts
once again.55 After more than a decade in the judicial sys-
tem, the dispute was finally settled as a consequence of a
private agreement reached between Reebok International,
Ltd., and the local entity who had registration in its name.
54. See Barreda, The Reebok Case in Peru, supra note 51, at 29-30.
55. See Arthur Golden, Reebok's Trademark Tied Up in Peru, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRIB., May 12, 1996, at I1. Criticisms continue to be levied against
rulings in Peru which seemingly encourage defendants to ignore decisions of the
Trademark and Copyright Offices and continue doing business as usual. See
Claudia Fernandini, Peru Tribunal Subverts Infringement Remedies, IP
WORLDWIDE, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 13, available in <http://www.ipww.com/
mar98/p13_peru.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
In short, the Tribunal has broad and unchecked authority to suspend
Trademark Office and Copyright Office decisions. And the Tribunal has
recently used this authority in a way that may have significantly
harmed parties' willingness to comply with Trademark. Office and
Copyright Office decisions. The Tribunal has made it clear that its
main concern is not to punish infringers. Its general policy is that
"[alttracting the pirate towards the legal market is more beneficial for
the rights owner and for society than excluding him entirely... the
informal market creates a demand which, intelligently handled,
reinforces the development possibilities of the formal market."
Id. But see Juan Pedro Van Hasselt, Is Peru Too Easy On Infringers? An Insider
Defends the Actions of Peru's IP Tribunal, IP WORLDWIDE, Sept./Oct. 1998, at
11, available in <http://www.ipww.com/sep98/pll-peru.html> (Mar. 10, 1999)
(on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
Critics are attacking, among other things, the Tribunal's decisions to
suspend injunctions against infringers, to decrease fines awarded
against infringers, and to take such actions without giving any oral
argument to the IP rights owners. On close inspection, however, it is
apparent that the Tribunal has acted in accord with Peruvian law, its
decisions are no threat to IP rights, and IP rights owners bear at least
some of the blame for the Tribunal's decisions against them.
Id.
56. E-mail from Jose Barreda, member of the Peruvian law firm Barreda
Moller and counsel to Reebok International, Ltd. in Peru, to author
(transmitted Dec. 5, 1997 12:49:33 EST) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
Mr. Barreda has also published various articles on the Reebok case and
trademark law in Peru. See Barreda, The Reebok Case in Peru, supra note 51;
Jose Barreda, Trademark Related Aspects of the New Industrial Property Law
in Peru, TRADEMARK WORLD, June/July 1996, at 32. Reebok International, Ltd.,
has had similar problems elsewhere in the world. One example was in Thailand
where the Supreme Court upheld two lower court rulings which awarded
Reebok International, Ltd., ownership of the name REEBOK in Thailand. The
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The stark distinction between South Africa's and Peru's
application of the well-known mark requirement of Article
6bis of the Paris Convention highlights the problems of the
Paris-Berne regime: lack of harmonization, disparate na-
tional treatment, and deficient enforcement and dispute
resolution provisions. The Paris-Berne model, despite its
noble intentions and centennial endurance, has balkanized
the international regime of intellectual property. 7 Indeed,
one bleak assessment noted that "there was a clear dis-
parity between the grandeur of the centenary celebrations
of 1983 and the relative meager achievements of the Paris
Convention."58 Similarly, one historian of the Berne Con-
vention remarked on the naivet6 of its centenary cele-
bration and the inability of the Convention to respond to
technological change and global interconnectedness:
[P]iracy issues looked as though they could be dealt with... the
impact of the new technologies of digitisation and compression
were only vaguely appreciated, the term "information
superhighway" had not come into vogue, and the problems of
computer programs and electronic databases appeared as minor, if
irritating, issues that did not really threaten the seamless web of
international copyright law and policy. How different all these
issues now appear ....
The TRIPs Agreement, while not a panacea for the
Paris-Berne afflictions, attempts to reglobalize inter-
national IPRs and so overcome the Paris-Berne short-
comings by linking trade to IP protection.0
II. TRIPs: A NEW PARADIGM
TRIPs has been described as a "revolution" in IP
protection.6' For the first time IPRs are being protected
under the rubric of international trade agreements. TRIPs
court found that a Thai corporation which had legally registered the name
REEBOK in Thailand did so to deceive customers that it was still acting as
Reebok's authorized distributor. See Reebok International Entitled to 'Reebok'
Name in Thailand, 9 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 134 (1995).
57. See Geller, supra note 33, at 103.
58. Ricketson, supra note 17, at 881.
59. Id. at 879.
60. See id.; Geller, supra note 33, at 103.
61. See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPs: Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, 31 COMION MET. L. REV. 1245, 1252 (1994).
62. The relationship between a uniform global IP system and the develop-
724 [Vol. 47
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is a "conceptual leap" that removes IPRs from the isolated
treatment afforded by the comparatively insular WIPO
Conventions.63 In order to benefit from the trade provisions
in GATT, nations must implement IP laws in accordance
with the TRIPs Agreement. Although membership in the
WIPO Conventions is widespread, some of the countries
with the least protection of IPRs and greatest incidences of
IP piracy are not members.' By incorporating IP protection
into GATT, it is believed that more nations will have an
incentive to provide IP protection in order to benefit from
the other trade provisions of GATT.65 While this Comment
ment of a prosperous global economy has not been studied extensively. In part
this is due to the fact that knowledge-based goods and services, in particular
technical knowledge, have only recently become an integral part of inter-
national trade. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. Other reasons for
the neglect in study have been put forward. First, Adam Smith's prescription to
look at capital labor and resources to determine why some countries are richer
than others fails to account for innovation and knowledge. Second, the Bretton
Woods institutions established after World War II, in particular the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have operated on the belief that
bringing more money to poor countries will help them develop. Third, the sub-
ject is difficult to study. It is hard to estimate how many inventions would have
been created if there had been IP protection in a given country. See Robert M.
Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the
World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 2, at 68, 71.
63. See Ricketson, supra note 17, at 882-83 (describing the compelling pre-
science of U.S. Trade Representative Emory Simon, speaking at an IP confer-
ence at the Max Planck Institute in 1988, in challenging traditionalist and
isolationist treatment of IP; and the surprising speed at which practitioners,
government officials, academics and industry representatives abandoned tradi-
tionalist views of IP and wholeheartedly adopted the new approach of linking
IPRs to the trade regime).
64. For example Singapore and Taiwan are not signatories to either the
Paris or the Berne Conventions. See Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the
Uruguay Round-Negotiating Strategies of the Western Industrialized Countries,
11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1339 (1990).
65. As of December 1998 there were 133 member nations to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the coordinating body of all GATT Uruguay Round
Agreements, and 35 observer governments. For a list of WTO members as of
December 20, 1998, see The Organization Members <http://www.wto.org/
wto/abouttorgansn6.htm> (Feb. 6, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
For background on the WTO, see JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 289-326 (1995); The Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. For a list of contracting parties as of September
22, 1998 to the Berne Convention, see Contracting Parties of Treaties
Administered by WIPO: Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/e-berne.htm> (Feb. 6, 1999) (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review). For a list of contracting parties as of
September 7, 1998 to the Paris Convention, see Contracting Parties of Treaties
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will not address specific provisions in the TRIPs Agreement
regarding the various forms of IP,66 the Agreement gen-
erally contains three categories of obligations:67 (i) it in-
corporates the major provisions of the WIPO Conventions;68
(ii) it supplements those Conventions with substantial ad-
ditional protection;69 and (iii) it provides enforcement and
dispute resolution procedures for all member countries. The
World Trade Organization (WTO) ° is seen as a more viable
institution than WIPO for enacting these changes because
of GATT's dual functions as a code of rules and a forum for
negotiation.'
Administered by WIPO: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property <http://www. wipo.org/eng/ratific/d-paris.htm> (Feb. 6, 1999) (on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
66. TRIPs addresses copyright and neighboring rights, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuit layout
designs and trade secrets. For a general overview of the substantive advances in
each of these areas provided for in TRIPs, see Ricketson, supra note 17, at 886-
90, and An Overview of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights <http://www.wto.orglwto/intellec/intell2.htm.> (Mar. 10, 1999)
(on file with the Buffalo Law Review). For a detailed analysis of TRIPs'
provisions in these areas, see BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 45-107.
67. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, AGREEMENT
ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, available in
1994 WL 761796.
68. TRIPs obliges member states to comply with the following substantive
provisions: Paris Convention, supra note 2, arts. 1-12, 19; Berne Convention,
supra note 2, arts. 1-21 and the Appendix relating to developing countries.
69. See Braga, supra note 3, at 389-93 (discussing the minimum standards
established in TRIPs for copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical
indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits,
trade secrets and control of unfair competition.)
70. The WTO is an international economic organization charged with
responsibility for all trade in goods and services among Member states. It is the
legal successor of GATT, assuming GATT's constitution from 1947 and all its
amendments. Its purpose is to provide an institutional framework and an
administrative body to oversee GATT 1994, TRIPs, and GATS (General
Agreement on Trade in Services). It provides a forum for international trade
negotiations and dispute settlement between Member states. See WTO
Agreement, supra note 65. See generally Gabrielle Marceau, Transitions from
GATT to WTO: A Most Pragmatic Operation, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1995, at
147; Jeffrey J. Schott, The Future Role of the WTO, in WORLD TRADE AFTER THE
URUGUAY ROUND 52, 63 (Harald Sander & Andrgs Inotai eds., 1996).
71. See Emmert, supra note 64, at 1344 (interpreting S. GOLT, THE GATT
NEGOTIATIONS 1986-90: ORIGINS, ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 2 (1988)). Although
TRIPs functions under the auspices of the WTO and despite the above
criticisms levied against the WIPO conventions, both administrative bodies
attempt to work cooperatively. That both the Berne and Paris Conventions are
incorporated into TRIPs indicates their continued relevance; however, the WTO
regime adds further substantive protections and provides a dispute resolution
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A. Code of Rules
Although it is much too early to meaningfully evaluate
the success of the TRIPs Agreement, particularly in light of
the transition periods for developing countries to implement
legislation and practices consistent with the Agreement,72
there are initial indications of its effectiveness. One author
describes the immediate impact of the TRIPs Agreement as
"an explosion of legislation bringing national statutes into
line with TRIPs norms."73
mechanism. In fact, the preamble to the TRIPs Agreement states that it desires
"to establish a mutually supportive relationship between the WTO and the
World Intellectual Property Organization." TRIPs, supra note 3. WIPO and
WTO entered into a cooperative agreement on December 22, 1995. See generally
World Intellectual Property Organization-World Trade Organization:
Agreement Between WIPO and WTO, 35 I.L.M. 754 (1996). For specific
examples of the continued cooperation between the WTO and the WIPO, see,
e.g., WTO to Propose Accord with WIPO on Coordinating Intellectual Property, 9
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 322 (1995). Numerous articles detail the on-going
important work of WIPO. See, e.g., WIPO Committee of Experts Examines
Protection of Well-Known Marks, 10 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 23 (1996); WIPO
Member States Endorse Establishment of New Committees, 12 WORLD INTELL.
PROP. REP. 335 (1998); WTO, WIPO to Coordinate in Getting Developing Nations
to Implement TRIPs, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 308 (1998); WIPO Hosts
Roundtable on IP and Indigenous Peoples, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 309
(1998). If size is any measure of importance, WIPO is planning to expand its
physical headquarters. WIPO to Expand Geneva Headquarters, 12 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 238 (1998). The United States is calling for expansion of
TRIPs to incorporate additional WIPO agreements such as the WIPO
Trademark Law Treaty of 1994 as well as the 1996 WIPO Treaty on Copyright
Law and the 1996 Treaty on Performance and Phonograms. These treaties all
extend IP protection beyond the minimum standards now set forth in TRIPs.
TRIPs is scheduled for review by WIPO member states starting in 2000. See
U.S. Official Urges Inclusion of WIPO Treaties in WTO Accord, 12 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REV. 373 (1998). See generally <http://www.wipo.org>.
72. Part VI of TRIPs is entitled "Transitional Arrangements." Articles 65
and 66 of Part VI provide that when a country joins the WTO, it has one year to
implement the provisions in TRIPs. Developing countries have four additional
years to implement TRIPs and least-developed countries are not required to
implement TRIPs for ten years. See TRIPs, supra note 3, arts. 65-66. Although
there is a tendency to assume that only developing countries need to reform
their IP laws in order to comply with TRIPs (hence the transitional
arrangements), in fact most developed countries also need to make changes to
their laws. One study discusses noncompliance by the United States, Japan,
and Member States of the European Union. See John E. Giust, Noncompliance
with TRIPs by Developed and Developing Countries: Is TRIPs Working?, 8 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 69, 80-91 (1997) (noting that "the U.S. is by no means in
perfect compliance").
73. BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at v. See, e.g., Mehmet Nazdim Aydin Deris,
Turkey Replaces Its IP Laws, IP WORLDWIDE, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 8, available in
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
While cataloging the advances made in each area of IP
covered in TRIPs is well beyond the scope of this Comment,
this section presents a global sampling of widespread
increases in international protection of trademarks in order
to suggest that developing countries are recognizing the
importance of protecting IPRs in order to maintain healthy
trade relations with the developed world. The McDonald's
case discussed above demonstrates one noteworthy foreign
decision granting recognition to famous marks." Increas-
ingly, other nations have taken a similar course. For in-
stance, India passed a new Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act in 1994 which has had a tremendous impact.5 Histor-
ically the common law rule in India recognized a trademark
owner's goodwill in a mark only through actual sales of
branded goods in India; transnational reputation did not
protect a mark in India. 6 After the much publicized
<http://www.ipww.com/mar98/p08_turkey.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review).
On June 27, 1993 Turkey enacted an entirely new set of IP laws. These
laws are dramatically different from what existed before.... Turkey
has adopted a fully integrated and coherent body of IP legislation.
These laws are fully harmonized... with the international conventions
to which Turkey belongs, including the Paris Convention [and] TRIPs.
Id. The proliferation of statutory changes throughout the world can be seen
through a quick perusal of any recent issue of the World Intellectual Property
Report, the pages of which are filled with country updates of significant IP
legislation. Particularly helpful is an annual survey that provides an "at-a-
glance" understanding of the volume of changes in IP laws throughout the
world. See Developments in Intellectual Property Rights, 12 WORLD INTELL.
PROP. REP. 206 (1998). Beyond national legislative response to TRIPs, regional
intellectual property associations have also proliferated in response to TRIPs.
See BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at v.
74. For an overview of treatment of trademarks around the world, see
Heather C. Steinmeyer & Alyssa Dudkowski, Nation-by-Nation Survey:
Protections for Well-Known and Famous Trademarks, IP WORLDWIDE, May/June
1997, at 43, available in <http://www.ipww.com/may97/p43nation.html> (Mar.
10, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review). See generally Marshall A.
Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL.
PRoP. L. REv. 1 (1998) (arguing that the effects of the information age and the
phenomenon of globalization have forced the evolution of international
trademark norms leading to simplification and expediency in acquiring and
protecting trademark rights worldwide).
75. See Dara P. Mehta & Sharad D. Abhyankar, India's Courts Increase
Protections for Foreign Trademarks, IP WORLDWIDE, May/June 1997, at 31,
available in <http://www.ipww.com/nov97/p31india.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review).
76. Id.
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decision in N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp.,7 it is now bind-
ing authority in India that well-known foreign marks are
entitled to protection.78
Whirlpool, a United States corporation, made and sold
washing machines internationally, having registered the
trademark WHIRLPOOL in more than sixty-five coun-
tries.79 Whirlpool Corp. had registered its trademark in
India between 1937 and 1977, but did not renew its regis-
tration after 1977 due to import restrictions imposed by the
Indian government." Defendant N.R. Dongre operated two
companies that manufactured washing machines in India,
and in 1986 successfully registered the trademark
WHIRLPOOL in India."' The court found that plaintiff
Whirlpool Corp., despite no registration in India and no
direct sales to the public in India, was entitled to the
benefit of the marks' transborder reputation known to
potential Indian customers through extensive advertise-
ments in foreign magazines circulating in India. 2 Finding
that the advertisements were equivalent to use, the court
issued an injunction against N.R. Dongre.83 In August 1997,
the Delhi High Court reinforced its decision in Whirlpool to
protect foreign brand names, remarking: "We must readily
support decisions which seek to promote commercial moral-
ity and discourage unethical trade practices." 4
In another example, the Mexican Institute of Industrial
Property (IMPI) 5 interpreted Mexico's Industrial Property
77. N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., 1995 A.I.R. 300, 302 (Del.) (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review).
78. The Appellate Division decision in N.R. Dongre was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of India. See N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp., 1996 J.T.S.C. 555,






84. Id. (restraining an Indian company from using the internationally
renowned Swiss trademarks SYNTHES and AO/ASIF); see HC Bars Indian Co.
from Using Foreign Firm's Trademark, ECON. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at 1
(discussing the decision regarding the SYNTHES and AOIASIF trademarks).
85. The Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) was established,
under the 1994 amendments to Mexico's Industrial Property Law of 1991, as an
autonomous agency with enforcement powers. Attorneys in Mexico point to
these changes as evidence of the harmonization of Mexican IP law with
international standards. See IMPI Nullifies Three Trademarks in Dispute Over
Use of "Boss" Mark, 9 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 231 (1995) (hereinafter IMPI
Nullifies).
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Law of 19916 to cancel three registrations of the mark
BOSS, based on the well-known status of the same mark of
German clothes maker Hugo Boss. 7 A local producer who
had registered and subsequently licensed the BOSS mark to
other Mexicans was found to infringe on the well-known
mark." After the decisions in favor of Hugo Boss, the
Director General of IMPI announced that "the message is
very simple-that pirate goods using known trademarks will
not be legal in Mexico." 9 Interestingly, the bolstering of
IPRs in Mexico not only extends rights but also poses
corresponding risks and responsibilities to foreign entities.
For example, Mexican law now requires any company man-
ufacturing branded goods in Mexico to have the legal right
to use the relevant trademark in Mexico, regardless of whe-
ther the manufactured products are made only for sale
outside of Mexico and no products are ever sold in Mexico."
Notably this aspect of Mexican trademark law contrasts
with U.S. trademark law, yet stems from legislation created
to strengthen Mexican IP law in accordance with NAFTA
and TRIPs.9
Chile reformed its trademark laws through Industrial
86. Note that Mexican IP laws were significantly amended in 1994, after
TRIPs, to provide for changes in trademark, patent, unfair competition and
administrative procedure laws. In the area of trademark law, the amendments
address well-known marks; cancellation for non-use of a trademark; the use of
business, corporate or partnership names on products and services; and the
scope of the right to exclusive use of a registered trademark. See Jamie
Delagado, Congress Passes Industrial Property Amendments; Mexico Will Join
PCT, 8 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 268 (1994).
87. IMPI Nullifies, supra note 85, at 231.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Randall Y. Broberg & Craig I. Celniker, Manufacturers Face
Infringement Risks in Mexico, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1998, at C18 ("The law makes
it clear.., that even goods designed only for immediate and direct export can
infringe Mexican trademarks."). Note that Mexican and U.S. trade
representatives recently entered into an agreement to combat intellectual
property violations in Mexico. See Anti-Piracy Measures to be Implemented By
June 30 Under Mexico-U.S. Agreement, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 228, 229
(1998) ("There seems to be a sincere willingness on the part of Mexico to take
action on IPR violations.").
91. See Broberg and Celniker, supra note 90, at C18. In the United States,
the Lanham Act requires that allegedly infringing marks be "used in
commerce." Under Mexican law, "merely using a mark Mexico in connection
with manufacturing operations without marketing or selling the products in
Mexico, and marketing or selling the products without manufacturing them in
Mexico both constitute use." This type of "commerce" would likely not be
protected under the Lanham Act. Id.
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Property Law Nr. 19.039, Articles 20(g) and 26. The statute
was found to protect Sea World in opposing registration of a
mark using Sea World's well-known whale design. 2 While
this decision is encouraging, problems still remain due to
the fact that the use of a mark is not required in Chile to
file a trademark registration application. Therefore, "pi-
rates" can still register well-known marks in their own
names absent pre-existing registration by the foreign owner
of the well-known mark.' In contrast Brazil, which in the
1970s and 1980s "was a haven for trademark pirates who
aggressively registered well-known brands and profited
handsomely," now refuses to register well-known marks
such as WALGREENS to unauthorized persons and has
canceled registrations for marks such as SOTHEBEYS.94
In Jamaica, Kmart Corp. sued a Jamaican corporation,
Kay Mart Limited, for trademark infringement and unfair
competition.95 Kmart argued that the Jamaican company,
by using the name "Kay Mart" and the "K" logo, was pass-
ing off its goods and services as originating with and spon-
sored by Kmart Corp. 5 The defendant, which incorporated
eleven years after Kmart had first registered its marks in
Jamaica, argued that because Kmart was not doing bus-
iness in Jamaica it had no legal rights there." The
Jamaican Supreme Court found for Kmart on the grounds
that worldwide reputation and goodwill may be achieved
without physical presence in Jamaica via global com-
munications technology, international travel, the Internet
and other similar mechanisms.98
In Denmark, the Maritime and Commercial Court (a
special court for trademark matters) decided in a judgment
dated April 30, 1998, that use of the mark AMW on wheels,
steering wheels and body works was confusingly similar to
the world-famous mark BMW.9 9 The court concluded that
92. See Sea World, Inc. v. Pesquera Mar-Cud Ltda, Case No. 114-94
(Appeals Court, 1995).
93. See Dyann L. Kostello, Where Goodwill is Established, Rights May
Follow, NAT'LL.J., May 18, 1998, at C8.
94. See id.
95. See id. See generally Kmart Corp. v. Kay Mart Ltd., Suit No. C.L.




99. See Mads Marstrand-Jorgensen, Court, in Denying "AMW" Mark,
Extends Protection to World-Famous Trademarks, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP.
73119991
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extraordinarily well-known marks such as BMW must be
given "an extended protection against other trade marks,
the use of which would imply an improper exploitation of
the distinctiveness of the trade mark or its reputation.""'
In a final example of global bolstering of trademark
law, Vietnam substantially updated, or rather transformed,
its IP laws when it passed its Civil Code in 1996-an "all
encompassing" piece of legislation addressing the rights and
obligations of Vietnamese citizens and businesses, over ten
percent of which is devoted to IP and technology transfer.10" '
One commentator remarked that while the "international
community still considers Vietnam as one of the 'bad boys'
with regard to counterfeiting," this reputation is no longer
deserved.' 2 Although trademark rights are now guaranteed
in Vietnam under Article 785 of the Code, there is a "dearth
of regulations and procedures regarding enforcement in the
event of infringement."' Nonetheless protection of IPRs
clearly has dramatically improved and continues to improve
so that even during this initial transitional stage IPRs are
being enforced with "the right approach and through estab-
lished relationships with IP agents and Vietnamese author-
ities." 4 The new code's tremendous attention to IPRs sug-
gests the Vietnamese government's commitment to inter-
national IP standards. That Vietnam is an observer govern-
ment to the WTO further substantiates that TRIPs likely
induced many of its recent and substantial changes.'"' With
regard to the issue of well-known marks, WIPO's standing
committee on trademarks is considering a proposal for a
memorandum of understanding that outlines provisions
that clarify and go beyond the requirements set forth in the
TRIPs Agreement.'
179 (1998).
100. Id. (quoting from an unpublished opinion).
101. See Stephen Hayward, Vietnam Continues Trademark Reforms, IP
WORLDWIDE, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 3, available in <http://vww.ipww.comljan98/




105. All observer countries have applied to join the WTO (except for the
Holy See and, for the time being, Ethiopia, Cape Verde and Bhutan). See The
Organization Members <http://www.wto.org/wto/aboutl organsn6.htm> (Mar.
10, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
106. See Standing Committee Examines Proposal on Well-Known Marks, 12
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 307, 308 (1998).
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The above global sampling of recent legislation and
judicial decisions regarding trademark protection is an im-
portant early indicator that, as a code of rules, TRIPs is
more than just a list of norms-that is, nations are imple-
menting, recognizing, and enforcing its normative prescrip-
tions, albeit to varying degrees.
[I]lt is one thing to align laws to TRIPs standards, [and] another to
effect a change of response from the judges, the law enforcement
agents, and to induce an atmosphere conducive to an effective
administration of intellectual property rights.
10 7
Of course not all WTO member countries have made
changes to protect well-known and famous marks or have
updated their trademark or other IP laws. Each year the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) publishes a
list of countries that fail to adequately protect U.S. IPRs.
The most recent list names fifteen trading partners on the
Priority Watch List: Argentina, Bulgaria, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, the European Union, Greece,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Macao, Russia and
Turkey. 8 Nonetheless, the USTR noted that "[i]ntellectual
107. SODIPO, supra note 2, at 84. Yet some commentators suggest TRIPs
doesn't go far enough, calling for a truly "supranational code." One view is that
TRIPs is not a systematic code, but a piecemeal incorporation of and
supplement to the Paris-Berne regime and thus "leaves patchwork law lagging
behind an increasingly networked marketplace." Paul Edward Geller, From
Patchwork to Network: Strategies for International Intellectual Property in Flux,
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 553, 558-59 (1998). China is an example of a nation
attempting to buttress IP enforcement through a new "rule of law" directive.
However, while China has relatively complete IP laws, including new
trademark counterfeiting provisions, enforcement of the laws is still a problem.
See Doris Estelle Long, China's IP Reforms Show Little Success: IP Enforcement
Remains Problematic, But Clever Owners Can Beat the Odds, IP WORLDWIDE,
Nov./Dec. 1999, at 3, available in <http://www.ipww.com/nov98/p03_china.
html> (Feb. 6, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
108. See Results of U.S. Trade Representative's 1998 Review of 'Special 301'
Provisions of Trade Act of 1974 Regarding Intellectual Property Protection,
Released May 1, 1998, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 195 (1998) (hereinafter
1998 Review of 'Special 301'. The priority watch list includes countries that
"have the most onerous and egregious acts, policies and practices which have
the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products"
and "are not engaged in good faith negotiations or making significant progress
in negotiations to address these problems." Id. The report also placed thirty-two
trading partners on a Watch List. See id. at 199-204. For an instructive
discussion of country specific IP barriers to foreign trade, see Excerpts from U.S.
Trade Representative's '1998 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers,' 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 158 (1998).
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property protection has been improving in part as a result
of the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.""9 Even in
East Asia, where the Western media have focused much
attention on piracy and counterfeiting activity, there is in-
creasing implementation of IP protective legislation."'
B. Forum for Negotiation
1. GATT Article XXIII. The dispute resolution mechan-
ism provided for in TRIPs offers additional evidence of the
likely effectiveness of the Agreement. Article XXIII is the
dispute settlement provision of GATT. It is expressly
incorporated by each of the WTO agreements including
TRIPs."' GATT Article XXIII provides that a complainant
109. See 1998 Review of 'Special 301' supra note 108, at 195.
110. After the conclusion of the GATT Uruguay round, many countries in
East Asia recognized the need for amendments to their IP laws in order to
conform to TRIPs if they were to continue to receive the benefits in reduction of
trade barriers under GATT. See generally Survey of Compliance with TRIPs
Agreement, 10 WORLD INLL. PROP. REP. 71 (1996) (evaluating the changes to
IP laws in Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, China and the Philippines). For a
variety of specific examples of increased IP protection in Asia see, e.g.,
Singapore Amends Control of Plants Act to Meet TRIPs Obligations, 12 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 334 (1998); Hong Kong's Prevention of Copyright Piracy
Ordinance, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 314 (1998); Taiwan's IPR Program
Will Strengthen Enforcement, Education, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 284
(1998); Jail Term Shows China's Tough Stance On Copyright Theft, Press Office
Says, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 223 (1998); Trade Mark (Amendment) Act
1994, Regulations Enter Into Force, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 11 (1998)
(discussing Malayasia); IPR Court Established by Taipei District Court, 12
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 311 (1998); Alonzo Q. Ancheta, Philippines Begins
New IP Regime, IP WORLDWIDE, Jan/Feb. 1998, at 9, available in <http://
www.ipww.com/jan98/p9philippines.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the
Buffalo Law Review); Rebecca Lo & Katherine Tsang, Hong Kong Takes Aim at
CD Pirates, IP WORLDWIDE, May/June 1998, at 27, available in <http:l/
www.ipww.com/may98/p27_honkong.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the
Buffalo Law Review); Kwan-Tao Li, Preparing for WTO Membership, Taiwan
Revises Its IP Laws, IP WORLDWIDE, May/June 1998, at 43, available in <http://
www.ipww.com/may98/p43_preparing.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the
Buffalo Law Review).
111. TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 64. Examples of other WTO agreements
incorporating GATT Article XXIII include, but are not limited to, Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS), Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement
on Agriculture. For the WTO dispute settlement provisions, see Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [WTO],
Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter DSU]. DSU Article 3.1 provides: "Members
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must demonstrate that a benefit accruing to it under the
Agreement is being nullified or impaired; or that the attain-
ment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as
a result of the failure of another contracting party to carry
out its obligations under the Agreement."' In recent years
the practice of the GATT Council has been to establish a
panel, generally consisting of three mutually agreed-upon
experts, if one contracting party claims another has acted
inconsistently with its obligations under GATT."' The panel
issues a report and recommendation, generally adopted by
the Council, after hearing the parties' arguments and
considering their briefs."4 Typically the panel recommends
the termination of any GATT violation and does not
recommend any broader punitive relief.' GATT Article
XXIII does allow for sanctions in the form of suspension of
concessions if a violation is not remedied, although this only
occurred once, over forty years ago."'
2. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). Ar-
ticle III of the WTO Agreement outlines the various
purposes of the WTO."7 It provides that one of its principle
functions is the administration of the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU)."8 The DSU provides a comprehensive forum and
process for dispute resolution, giving greater detail to the
general structure of GATT Article XXIL" 9 First, the parties
affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes
heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules
and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein."
112. See JACKSON, supra note 65, at 348-71 (discussing the scope of Article
XXIII, including panel reports concerned with nullification and impairment as
well as remedies available to successful complainants).
113. See id. at 327.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 366.
116. See id. at 343-44. In 1955 the Netherlands was allowed to suspend
concessions made to the United States due to U.S. quotas on Dutch agricultural
products, however the Netherlands never utilized the authorization. Id.
117. See WTO Agreement, supra note 65.
118. Id. art. IM(3).
119. For discussion of how the WTO process makes fundamental changes to
the GATT system, see JACKSON, supra note 65, at 341-46. In general the WTO
modified the GATT dispute settlement procedures to reflect developments in
international arbitration. See Frederick S. Ringo, The Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement in the GATT and Legal Implications for
Sub-Saharan Africa, J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1994, at 120, 136; see also Palitha
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must attempt to resolve their differences through consul-
tations. 2 ° Second, the parties may request conciliation and
mediation services if consultations fail.' Third, a panel
may be established to hear the dispute, panel members are
selected and the panel's responsibilities are established.'
Fourth, the panel hears the dispute and issues a report to a
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)."' Fifth, the recommen-
dation of the panel report is adopted unless unanimously
rejected by the DSB. 2 Sixth, any party to a dispute may
appeal a panel decision to the Appellate Body.125 Seventh,
the implementation of adopted panel or appellate reports is
monitored. 6 Lastly, the DSB may authorize sanctions in
the form of withdrawal of concessions if an adopted panel
recommendation is not implemented. 2 '
With regard to concerns of developing countries, the
DSU contains special requirements for providing legal
expertise to developing country Members involved in dis-
pute settlement proceedings.'28 Most importantly, develop-
ing countries will benefit from having retaliatory measures
of developed countries subject to WTO review. Industrial-
ized nations may not unilaterally punish poorer countries
for alleged IP violations under TRIPs. With this type of
monitored system, smaller countries will be less hesitant to
challenge larger countries on whom their trade depends,
and powerful countries will be more restrained from
bullying tactics. Indeed, throughout negotiations in the
Uruguay Round, developing countries emphasized system
strengthening as their overriding objective, stressing the
need for an enforceable, non-discriminatory multilateral
trading system. 9 Such a system protects developing
T.B. Kohona, Dispute Resolution Under the World Trade Organization: An
Overview, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 23; Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Mechanism" Coverage and Procedures of the WTO Understanding, J.
WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1995, at 5.
120. DSU, supra note 111, art. 4.
121. Id. art. 5.
122. Id. arts. 6-8.
123. Id. arts. 9-15.
124. Id. arts. 16, 20.
125. Id. arts. 17-19.
126. Id. art. 21.
127. Id. art. 22.
128. Id. art. 27(2).
129. See John Whalley, Developing Countries and System Strengthening in
The Uruguay Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
306, 307 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995).
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countries from bilateral pressure and preserves an
openness needed to reap the benefits of long-term trade
cooperation and expansion.3 °
Studies of the GATT dispute system indicate note-
worthy success.' First, according to one study only about
forty percent of disputes result in panel decisions, indicat-
ing that most controversies are amicably settled inform-
ally.' This demonstrates the strength of GATT's primary
role as a code of rules."3 Second, complaining parties report
having received full satisfaction in sixty percent of the cases
and partial satisfaction in twenty-nine percent of the cases-
indicating an overall success rate of almost ninety
percent.' Finally, the system has been much utilized,
demonstrating the confidence of Member countries. For
example, one study noted that in comparison to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the number of cases
taken up by the GATT system totaled over four hundred
while the ICJ had heard fewer than one hundred cases
since its origin in 1945."'
Tying IPRs to the trade provisions of GATT under the
auspices of the WTO will promote continued resort to the
Agreement's dispute resolution procedures. That the Paris
and Berne Conventions are removed from the trade context
undermines the ability of a complainant to compel an in-
fringing nation to settle the dispute. The Paris and Berne
Conventions are essentially a set of guiding principles that136
member countries may or may not adopt. TRIPs, in large
130. See id. at 322.
131. See generally ROBERT E. HuDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw
(1993).
132. See id. at 375-83; see also JACKSON, supra note 65, at 339.
133. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
134. See HUDEC, supra note 131, at 285-87; JACKSON, supra note 65, at 339.
135. See id. Notably, the ICJ is the dispute resolution body of both the Paris
and Berne Conventions. See Paris Convention, supra note 2, art. 28; Berne
Convention, supra note 2, art. 33.
136. See Mary M. Squyres, New Treaties Add Protections for Well-Known
Marks, IP WORLDwIDE, May/June 1997, at 30, available in <http://www.
ipww.com/may97/p30treaties.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo
Law Review). The pre-TRIPs era of IP protection has been described as a
"relatively loose international IPR system... in existence for more than one
hundred and fifty years." Ringo, supra note 119, at 122. The Paris and Berne
Conventions sought primarily to ensure the principle of national treatment.
TRIPs, by contrast, addresses the strength, form and duration of IPRs
throughout the world and provides a mechanism for review and enforcement of
its detailed standards. See THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING
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part a response to the enforcement problems of the WIPO
conventions," 7 has more authority because it is a self-exe-
cuting treaty.'38 For the first time, an international IP
agreement provides an enforcement mechanism which can
be utilized regardless of legislation or lack thereof in
member countries.'39
3. Evidence of Success. Although not yet utilized
enough in TRIPs-related disputes to offer any settled con-
clusions, the initial evidence suggests the force and value of
the dispute resolution system. In one widely reported case,
the United States filed a request to consult with the
Government of Pakistan pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU
and Article 64 of TRIPs. The U.S. alleged that Pakistan had
failed to meet its obligation under TRIPs to either grant
ECONOMIES at xvi (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995). TRIPs "goes
beyond the comity approach of most IPR conventions." Braga, supra note 3, at
388.
137. Congress gave authority to the United States Trade Representative to
take unilateral action and publish a list of countries that fail to protect U.S
IPRs in direct response to the inadequacy of enforcement of IPRs under
international law. Prior to TRIPs, attempts by industrialized countries to
tighten enforcement mechanisms in international IP conventions such as the
Paris Convention proved unsuccessful. See Ringo, supra note 119, at 122.
Indeed some suggest that the pre-TRIPs IP regime was insufficient to enforce
IPRs and stop unauthorized use of IP because it never intended to be able to do
so. See id. at 126. In contrast, under TRIPs the enforcement procedure requires
the domestic laws of Member nations to provide for causes of action against
infringement of IPRs. See id. at 135.
138. See Squyres, supra note 136. Self-executing treaties have direct effect
in domestic law. Treaties that are not self-executing must be effectuated
through an "act of ransformation"-that is, a government action, such as a
statute, to incorporate the treaty into domestic law. See John H. Jackson,
Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INTL.
L. 310 (1992).
139. See Squyres, supra note 136. Members of the TRIPs Agreement are
required to provide remedies to prevent infringement and create deterrents to
infringement. Holders of IPRs must have access to civil and administrative
procedures and criminal procedures must be available for certain willful
activities. These private enforcement requirements are separate from the
dispute resolution procedures available to Member states. See Braga, supra
note 3, at 394. Of course Member states must bring their laws into compliance
with TRIPs or they will be taken through the dispute resolution process. Indeed
the United States Congress, in order to bring its laws into compliance with
TRIPs, passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) which amended,
along with other laws, the copyright, trademark and patent laws of the United
States. See generally Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108
Stat. 4809 (1994).
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patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products or to establish systems for filing appli-
cations for patents on such inventions. " After consultation,
the two governments issued a notification of a mutually-
agreed solution, providing:
[T]he Governments of the United States and Pakistan agree that
Pakistan was obligated under Article 70.8 of the TRIPs Agreement
to establish a system for the filing of patent applications on such
inventions by 1 January 1995. The two governments also agree
that Pakistan is also obligated under Article 70.9 of the TRIPs
Agreement to establish a system to grant exclusive marketing
rights to such patent applicants if they meet certain criteria. To
fulili these obligations, Pakistan President Farooq Ahmad Kahn
Leghari issued on 4 February 1997 Ordinance No. XXVI of 1997.141
Arguably Pakistan would not have responded so favorably
and so quickly absent the dispute settlement provisions of
the WTO Agreement. Only after the United States' request
for a WTO panel investigation did Pakistan suggest further
consultations which ultimately lead to the amicable settle-
ment.
4 2
Other similar consultations have frequently been re-
solved by mutually-agreed solutions.4  One notable example
140. See Pakistan-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS36/4, IP/D/2/Add.1 (Mar. 7, 1997) [hereinafter U.S.-
Pakistan Solution] (notification of mutually-agreed solution), available in 1997
WL 371039; see also Pakistan: Conclusion of WTO Dispute Settlement
Proceeding Regarding Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural
Chemicals, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,695 (1997) (describing the investigation by the
Office of the United States Trade Representative initiated under section
302(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974).
141. See U.S.-Pakistan Solution, supra note 140.,
142. See Pakistan: USTR Ends Section 302 Probe After Ordinance
Amending Patent Law, 11 WoRLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 275 (1997).
143. For a discussion of the mechanics and function of WTO consultations,
see generally Gary N. Horlick, The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute
Resolution: A Private Practitioner's View, 32 INT'L LAW. 685 (1998). Horlick
suggests that one of the main functions of the consultation phase of dispute
resolution is to encourage parties to settle cases. See id. at 691. The Office of the
United States Trade Representative remarked on the success of the WTO
consultations:
The new dispute settlement rules often make it possible for us to
enforce WTO agreements without ever having to reach a panel
decision. The fact that the WTO can and will authorize us to retaliate
pays off in earlier settlements.... We have already used the WTO
procedures to obtain favorable settlements in some important cases.
Report on Trade Expansion Priorities Pursuant to Executive Order 12901
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concerned consultations between Japan and the United
States. Japan agreed to promulgate amendments to the
Japanese Copyright Law to comply with the TRIPs obli-
gation to grant protection to artistic performances that have
been "performed in a WTO Member and existing sound
recordings first fixed in a WTO Member or fixed by a na-
tional of a WTO Member for a term of at least fifty years
from the end of the calendar year in which the performance
took place or the sound recording was fixed....',," Likewise,
the United States requested consultations with Portugal
concerning TRIPs' requirements on the terms of existing
patents.'4 -Portugal agreed with the United States Trade
Representative's interpretation of Article 33 of TRIPs and
announced it would change its patent law to provide a
twenty year term of protection to patents in force on
January 1, 1996 and to those patents granted from appli-
cations pending on January 1, 1996.146 Most recently,
Sweden and the United States have notified the DSU of a
mutually-agreed solution to the United States' concern that
Sweden failed to meet its obligation under TRIPs "to make
available provisional measures inaudita altera parte in civil
proceedings involving intellectual property rights."147 The
Parliament of Sweden passed legislation on November 25,
1998 that came into effect January 1, 1999 that amended
Sweden's Copyright Act, Trademarks Act, Patents Act,
Design Protection Act, Trade Names Act, Act on Protection
of Semiconductor Products and Plant Breeders Act to allow
a court to order a search for evidence of infringement if
there is reason to believe that an individual has or soon will
infringe intellectual property rights.
4 8
Of course, when consultations do not resolve a conflict,
a complaining state may request a panel examination pur-
("Super 301"), 62 Fed. Reg. 52,604, 52,611 (1997).
144. Japan-Measures Concerning Sound Recordings, WT/DS28/4 (Feb. 5,
1997) (notification of mutually-agreed solution), available in 1997 WL 424041.
145. See Termination of Section 302 Investigation Regarding Portugal's
Implementation of the Patent Protection Provisions of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,351 (1996).
146. See Portugal-Patent Protection Under the Industrial Property Act,
WT/DS37/2, IP/D/3/Add.1, WT/DS37/2/Corr.1, IP/D/3/Add.1Corr.1 (Oct. 1, 1996)
(notification of mutually-agreed solution), available in 1996 WL 908909.
147. Sweden-Measures Affecting the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS86/2, IP/D/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1998) (notification of mutually-agreed




suant to Article 6 of the DSU.'49 Panel decisions may be ap-
pealed pursuant to Article 17 of the DSU. India was the
first country to utilize this procedure and the result is the
clearest and strongest measure of the effectiveness and
likely ramifications of TRIPs' dispute resolution process.
India appealed from a panel decision in favor of the United
States which held that India failed to comply with a TRIPs
requirement to either grant patent protection for pharma-
ceutical and agricultural chemical products or to establish
systems for filing applications for patents on such inven-
tions.' WTO Member States are obliged to grant patent
protection as of January 1, 1996 to "any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and
are capable of industrial application."15' Developing coun-
tries are granted until January 1, 2005 to meet this
obligation.' By virtue of this transition period India does
not presently provide product patents on drugs, phar-
maceuticals and agricultural chemicals; it does, however,
grant process patents which enable Indian pharmaceutical
companies to manufacture low cost new products for the
international market.'
The benefit of the transition period exacts a quid pro
quo from the developing country. During the transition
period a developing country must establish a "mailbox"
149. See, e.g., Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS59/6 (June 13, 1997) (request for panel by U.S.), available in
1997 WL 370534.
150. See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India Panel Report]
(report of the panel), available in 1997 WL 556224; India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/6 (Oct. 16,
1997) (notification of an appeal by India), available in 1997 WL 644454. Note
this is the same provision in TRIPs that Pakistan agreed to meet after
consultations with the U.S. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text; see
also India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, 1997 WL 113721 (Mar. 6, 1997) (first submission of the U.S.)
(requesting that a dispute resolution panel find that India must establish and
maintain mailbox and exclusive marketing rights systems consistent with
TRIPs requirements).
151. TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 27.
152. See id. art. 65(4).
153. See India Considers Immediate Approval for Pharmaceutical, Chemical
Patents, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 297, 298 (1998). U.S. and European
pharmaceutical companies accuse Indian companies of pirating about $500




system for filing of patent applications. These applications
will be reviewed once the transition period ends and patent
protection is possible."" Additionally, the developing coun-
try must grant exclusive marketing rights for a product in
the "mailbox" during the interim period.55 India made two
failed attempts to implement legislation to bring its laws
into compliance with the mailbox and marketing provi-
sions.'56 The United States then brought its complaint
before the WTO. The WTO panel concluded that India did
not "adequately achieve the object and purpose of Article
70(8) and protect legitimate expectations contained therein
for inventors of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products." 5 ' On appeal the WTO appellate body upheld the
dispute panel's ruling.'58
This decision is important not so much for its inter-
pretation of the "mailbox" rule, but because it was the first
intellectual property case to go through the entire WTO
dispute resolution process. As such it demonstrates "the
willingness of the WTO to take swift action to enforce
TRIPs."'59 While on the one hand the dispute highlights the
fact that some developing countries may be slow in enacting
TRIPs requirements, on the other hand India's experience
should likely induce compliance by other countries. Indeed
U.S. Trade Representative Charles Barshefsky described
the decision as "an important precedent."6 ' Interestingly,
after continued sparring with the United States over how
long India should take to implement an appropriate
"mailbox" system, 6' India recently began to consider grant-
154. See TRIPs, supra note 3, art. 70(8). Moreover, the patent applicant may
use the original filing date to the "mailbox" system for purposes of establishing
novelty in the patent prosecution. Id.
155. Id. art. 70(9).
156. See Charters Macdonald-Brown & Leon Ferera, First WTO Decision on
TRIPs, EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv., Feb. 1997, at 69.
157. See India Panel Report, supra note 150, at *55.
158. See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) (report of the appellate
body), available in 1997 WL 781259; see also, WTO Appellate Body Upholds
Drug Patent Ruling Against India, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 58 (1998).
159. See Macdonald-Brown & Ferera, supra note 156, at 69. For a succinct
chronology of the major events in the resolution of this dispute, see id. at 70
(detailing how the entire process, from a request for consultations to the
publishing of the Appellate Body Report, took only 17 months).
160. See WTO Appellate Body Upholds Drug Patent, supra note 158, at 58.
161. See U.S., India Spar Again on Protection of U.S. Farm-Chemical, Drug
Patents, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 115 (1998); India Agrees to 15-Month
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ing product patents immediately 16 2-further demonstrating
the strength of TRIPs and the weight of the dispute
resolution process. In accordance with the requirements of
the DSU, India has provided status reports to the WTO
regarding the implementation of the Appellate Body Report.
The Government of India first reported that it was
"exploring various options.., and [that] a series of inter-
departmental and inter-Ministerial consultations have been
initiated in this regard."163 The government then announced
in another status report that the "Patents (Amendment)
Ordinance was promulgated on 8 January 1999 to amend
the Patents Act to comply with the obligations as contained
in Article 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPs Agreement."'64 How-
ever, the United States has expressed concern that the
Ordinance fails to meet the TRIPs standards and therefore
the "United States seeks to discuss [its] concerns regarding
the Ordinance with Indian officials at their earliest con-
venience. " '65
The above examples of consultations and the India
panel decision, all in the infancy of TRIPs, suggest "the
dispute resolution procedures are far more effective than
those available previously under GATT."'66 That there are
Period For Implementation of WTO Ruling, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 182
(1998); USTR Announces Termination of Investigation of India, 12 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 227 (1998).
162. See India Considers Immediate Approval for Pharmaceutical, Chemical
Patents, supra note 153, at 297 ("IT]he government has begun to consider the
Trade Ministry's view favoring the upgrade of the existing patent law to cover
such patents immediately instead of waiting until 2005, which is when
developing countries must provide patent protection under WTO rules."). In
some ways this possibility is not so unlikely given India's recent decision to
accede simultaneously to the Paris Convention and the Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT) in order to benefit the country's technological and economic
development. See WIPO Announces Accessions to Paris Convention, PCT, 12
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 325, 326 (1998); India Set to Sign Paris Convention,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at All (describing India's decision to join the Paris
Convention as a "very major change in attitude").
163. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WTDS50110 (Nov. 12, 1998) (status report by India),
available in 1998 WL 791621.
164. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/10/Add.1 (Jan. 14, 1999) (status report by India),
available in 1999 WL 14039.
165. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WS/DS50/11 (Jan. 20, 1999) (communication from the
permanent mission of the U.S.), available in 1999 WL 20262.
166. See Macdonald-Brown & Ferera, supra note 156, at 73. The World
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now over one hundred cases (far more than originally anti-
cipated) going through the system67 indicates global con-
fidence in the WTO process and resolve to promulgate
TRIPs norms.
III. FEARS OF WESTERN ECONOMIC AND MORAL IMPERIALISM
Indira Gandhi, speaking at the World Health Assembly
in May 1982, proclaimed: "[tihe idea of a better-ordered
world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of
patents and there will be no profiteering from life and
death."' While Western, industrialized countries employ
the value-laden language of "piracy" and "counterfeiting" to
describe lax protection of IP in the developing world,69
lesser developed and newly industrialized countries find a
moral foundation for weak IP protection in Gandhi's words.
From the developing countries' point of view, weak pro-
tection of IP can serve to protect life itself by ensuring a
supply of essential goods, particularly in the fields of edu-
cation and medicine, for both sustenance and devel-
opment.1 ° A survey of the literature about what is variably
termed the "North-South debate"' reveals two distinct
Trade Organization maintains a database of documents-including requests for
consultations and panel reports-accessible online at <http://www.wto.org/ddf/
ep/public.html> (Mar. 10, 1999). For an early assessment of the WTO dispute
resolution system generally (that is, not specific to TRIPs), see Terence P.
Stewart & Mara M. Burr, The WTO's First Two and a Half Years of Dispute
Resolution, 23 N.C. INT'L & COM. REG. 481 (1998); Terence P. Stewart & Mara
M. Burr, The WTO Panel Process: An Evaluation of the First Three Years, 32
INT'L LAW. 709 (1998).
167. See Macdonald-Brown & Ferera, supra note 156, at 73.
168. R. Michael Gadbaw & Leigh A. Kenny, India, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 186, 186 (R. Michael
Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
169. See CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY
ROUND & THE THmD WORLD 121 (1990) (suggesting that use of these terms,
especially by the media, has co-opted the debate by painting the developing
countries' position and activities as immoral and criminal). Moreover, it has
been noted that these are words with no recognized technical meaning in the
law of intellectual property. SODIPO, supra note 2, at 123.
170. See Emmert, supra note 64, at 1383 (discussing the concerns in
developing countries of farmers who require access to cheap seed fertilizers and
agro-chemicals; ill people who need affordable medicines; and students who
require cheap educational supplies and materials).
171. See generally STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE (Wolfgang E. Siebeck
et al. eds., World Bank Discussion Papers 1990); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J.
1999] TRIPS AGREEMENT 745
lexicons-one of politics and economics"' and another of
sociology and cultural anthropology,73 with developed na-
tions employing the former and developing countries the
latter. Legal conclusions emerge from both regarding the
appropriate force of IP protection in international discourse
and commerce.
A. The Conflict of Rights
A common criticism levied against the TRIPs
Agreement maintains that it violates the sovereign right of
nations to development;" 4 however, Western industrialized
countries contend that intellectual property rights are
natural, human rights and are so recognized in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).'75 TRIPs
Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5
J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1991).
172. See Carlos Alberta Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property
Rights and the GATT: A View From the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243,
252-55 (1989) (elucidating the legal, political, philosophical and economic
dimensions of the north-south distinction).
173. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things:
Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization,
10 AM. U. J. INTL. L. & POLY 791 (1995).
174. The right to development under international law was first put forward
by Kdba M'Baye in 1972 and was adopted by the United Nations' General
Assembly in 1986 in the Declaration on the Right to Development, although it
has undergone serious attack as hopelessly utopian. See Richard Warren Perry,
Rethinking the Right to Development: After the Critique of Development, After
the Critique of Rights, 18 L. & POLY 227, 227-28 (1996). This issue of Law &
Policy is a special issue on the right to development. Professor Makau Wa
Mutua's editorial introduction describes the special issue as "hop[ing] to jump
start ostensibly stalled conversations on the right to development." Makau Wa
Mutua, Editor's IntroduCtion, 18 L. & POLY 195 (1996). Blakeney adds that "as
with human rights, the concept of private natural property rights exists in
uneasy tension with countervailing public rights such as the 'universal right to
share in scientific advancement' and the so called 'right to development.'"
BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 151.
175. The preamble to the first European patent statute, the Inventors Act of
Venice of 1474, proclaimed the philosophical foundation in natural law for
granting IPRs:
We have amongst us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover
ingenious devices... now if provision were made for the works and
devices discovered by such persons, so that others who may see them
could not build them and take the inventor's honour away, more men
would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build devices
of great utility and benefit to our commonwealth.
See BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 149-50. But see Gana, supra note 17, at 344 n.5
(explaining the provision in Article 27 of the UDHR protecting the right to the
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accentuates the tension between these discordant "regimes
of rights. " '16 While those opposed to TRIPs see international
protection of IP and the sovereign right to development in
direct conflict, TRIPs adherents view these rights as com-
plimentary-that in order to develop, nations must recognize
and employ IP protection. 77
Removed from the language of rights, the conflict can be
recast in terms of the "public-good" nature of knowledge:
the tension between the social desirability of widespread
dissemination of available know-how and the arguable need
for society to reward creators of new information.' It is as
much an economic debate about public interests versus
monopoly interests..9 as it is about defining human rights
norms. Yet whether based on the language of rights or util-
ity, the solution that TRIPs offers resolves the conflict
squarely in favor of developed nations.' TRIPs teaches that
while the right to IP protection may not be more "right"
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production). Gana maintains "there is nothing about intellectual property
protection that makes it a universal ideal, and the human rights framework
should not endorse a system that perpetuates the subordination of values and
ideals of societies in developing countries to the economic interests of countries
in the Western Hemisphere." Id. at 317.
176. See generally, CELIA LURY, CULTURAL RIGHTS: TECHNOLOGY, LEGALITY
AND PERSONALITY 11 (1993) (exploring the rights of copying in relation to
cultural work).
177. See, e.g., Griffith B. Price, Jr., Protecting Intellectual Property: How
New Democracies Stand to Gain, 3 ECON. REFORM TODAY (1995), available in
<http://www.cipe.org/e17/ip3_95.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with the Buffalo
Law Review).
[T]echnological advances in key sectors have become the sine qua non
for all countries if they are to unleash the creativity and entrepreneur-
ship essential to their success in achieving further economic and social
progress. And for technology-poor nations, development and transfer of
know-how particularly suited to their needs depends on the nature of
incentives and protection they are ready to offer both foreign and local
owners of intellectual property.
Id.
178. See Judith C. CHIN & GENE M. GROSSMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE 1 (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 2769, 1988).
179. See Raghavan, supra note 169, at 132.
180. See Bernard Hoekman, Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in
THE NEW GATT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 84, 110 (Susan M.
Collins & Barry P. Bosworth eds., 1994) ("The TRIPs agreement may not be
perfect from the perspective of U.S. industry... [bIut... [uit is fair to say that
developing countries agreed to much more than even an optimist might have
hoped for in 1986.").
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than the right to sovereign development, it certainly is
more powerful.
B. The Developing Countries'Argument
1. Rights Analysis. Critics of TRIPs argue that protec-
tion of IP cannot be justified as a human right, not because
it is per se wrong, but because it is not a universal norm. 8'
It emerges from a Western liberal ideology of individual
dignity." Yet for many non-industrial societies, the values
of liberty and autonomy of self and property are incon-
sistent with, if not anathema to, their experience."' As one
critic explains:
Most Third World societies are organized around a social unit
which extends certainly beyond the individual and, in most cases,
beyond the nuclear family. The forms and very definition of
ownership are thus crafted in a way opposite to property
conceptions of western legal and economic structures central to the
development of private and public law. 14
According to this view, unique political, social and economic
realities that create national and individual identities
different from Western tradition must ultimately be
accounted for in determining a developmental scheme."
For example, compliance with copyright law may be
virtually meaningless to individuals from societies in which
oral rather than written, histories and stories predomin-
ate.?" In Confucian China it was believed that copying
another's creations was a laudable form of reverence.
181. See Gana, supra note 17, at 326.
182. See id. at 323.
183. See id. at 339.
184. Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some
Implications of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & PoLY 109, 136 (1995).
185. See Gana, supra note 17, at 339.
186. See id. at 340.
187. See Glenn R. Butterton, The Empire Strikes Back: Piracy with Chinese
Characteristics, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1131-32 (1996); Bronckers, supra
note 61, at 1278. See generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN
ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION (1995)
(discussing the history of IP development in China). For a succinct history of IP
in China, see Gregory S. Feder, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in
China: You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But You Can't Make It Drink, 37 VA. J.
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Such a "collectivist mentality"'88 is dissonant to the Western
property paradigm. Indeed "[wihat is perceived as a wrong
by U.S. cultural and legal standards... might not be a
wrong under the cultural and legal standards of other na-
tions."189 One study described as an "ethnographic view of
intellectual property"' suggests that the concept of IP is
unamenable to indigenous peoples who practice collective
ownership. A Guyanese native, for example, who believes
the greenheart nut is a gift from the gods and that its
properties are therefore self-evident to all, cannot conceive
of limiting use of the nut for purposes of controlling ovu-
lation to the "inventor" of this process. 91
One of the early objections of many developing coun-
tries to the TRIPs Agreement concerned the interface be-
tween international IPRs and environmental protection. In
India, the controversy centered on the U.S. chemical com-
pany W.R. Grace's patent on a process for extracting chem-
icals from the famed neem tree which is widely used by
indigenous peoples for making traditional medicines,
antiseptic toothbrushes, natural insecticides, contraceptives
and even soap.' 9' Critics are concerned that TRIPs will take
control of agricultural products, like neem seeds, away from
local communities and give it to large, often foreign, cor-
porations.193
Some suggest that rather than warranting the vener-
ation of a human right, international IP protection in fact
violates the human rights of people whose norms, traditions
and history do not reflect those of Europe and the United
States.'94 The fact that the developed West fails to recognize
or ignores this difference suggests it may underestimate the
facility of local institutions, traditional ideas, and social
INT'LL. 223, 230-39 (1996).
188. Anna M. Han, Technology Licensing to China: The Influence of Culture,
19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 629, 638 (1996).
189. Pamela E. Kraver & Robert E. Purcell, Application of the Lanham Act
to Extraterritorial Activities: Trend Toward Universality or Imperialism?, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. So0'y 115, 137 (1995).
190. A. David Napier, Saving or Enslaving: The Paradox of Intellectual
Property, 25 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL Soc. OxFORD 49, 50 (1994).
191. Id. at 57-58.
192. See Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International
Intellectual Property and Environmental Protection: Biodiversity and
Biotechnology, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255, 257-59 (1998).
193. See id.
194. See Gana, supra note 17, at 340-41.
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values to adopt a new paradigm of IPRs.'95 One critic main-
tains that "the presumption that U.S. law is morally and
intellectually superior to the law of other countries smacks
of ignorance and arrogance."
96
Ultimately, from the perspective of developing nations,
a legitimate human rights analysis of IP protection would
reflect and incorporate cultural sensitivities.'97 Moreover, it
would account for the more pressing concerns of many de-
veloping countries: huge national debts, high unemploy-
ment, natural disasters, civil wars, political instability, mal-
nutrition and illiteracy.'98 The book How To Read Donald
Duck written by Chilean Marxists, illustrates this point
well.6' Disney used its copyright and trademark rights in
Donald Duck to attempt to limit circulation of the book
which was critical of U.S. imperial interests in Latin
America. But the question of whether the Chilean gov-
ernment should focus its limited resources on protecting
Disney's property interests is not easily answered.
One might well question the wisdom of countries beleaguered by
the challenges and social costs of malnutrition, child prostitution,
sex tourism, AIDS, foreign debt, and structural adjustment
policies putting scarce resources into tracking down those who
would appropriate Looney Tunes characters or deploy the icons of
American Xopular culture to satirize U.S. power and its capitalist
presence.
Further undermining the West's depiction of IP as a
human right is its own history of selective protection. For
example, early copyright laws in the United States limited
protection to domestic authors and allowed copying of works
published in foreign countries. 20' It is commonly suggested
that the condoned piracy of foreign-published books
"indirectly fostered the growth of the American publishing
195. See Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs
Agreement, 29 VAN). J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 774 (1996).
196. Kraver & Purcell, supra note 189, at 115.
197. See Gana, supra note 17, at 335.
198. See id.
199. See ARIEL DoRFMAN, How to READ DONALD DucK: IMPERIALIST
IDEOLOGY IN THE DISNEY CoMIc (1995). For the original Spanish version, see
ARIEL DORFMiAN, PARA LEER AL PATO DONAL (1995).
200. Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary
Borders in a Less-Than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1366 (1996).
201. See Gana, supra note 17, at 327.
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industry."22 Indeed the first federal copyright law in the
United States provided that it should not be construed "to
extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting, or
publishing within the United States, of any map, chart,
book or books, written, printed, or published by any person
not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places
within the jurisdiction of the United States." 3 Astonish-
ingly, the United States did not accede to the Berne
Convention until 1988-and then motivated less by a desire
to offer protection to foreign works than a desire to garner
greater protection abroad for works of U.S. origin.
Therefore, developing countries commonly argue that in-
dustrialized nations now want to deny them the same ad-
vantages the West once used in order to develop.0 Even if
IPRs merit human rights status as the West urges (despite
examples of the West violating its own norms), some devel-
oping countries argue that the right to development is none-
theless a compelling interest which trumps the property
rights accorded inventive activity.
2 6
2. Utility Analysis. Developing countries also suggest a
number of economic arguments against international pro-
tection of IP which, although removed from the discourse of
rights, are still related to notions of sovereignty and devel-
opment. For example, the monopoly privilege granted to
owners of IP, in particular foreign owners, can have deva-
stating economic effects on developing nations due to the
owner's power to determine whether, and the terms on
which, a protected work will be available in a given mar-
ket.0 7 This power is particularly important in crucial and
sensitive areas such as agriculture, medicine and education.
Additionally, the evidence of the successful industrial-
ization of countries in East Asia, particularly the "four little
202. SODIPO, supra note 2, at 16.
203. Id. at 15-16 n.44.
204. See id. at 16. And still there is some question as to whether the United
States fully complies with Berne's "moral rights" provisions in Article 6bis. See
Giust, supra note 72, at 87.
205. In addition to the example of U.S. copyright laws, some industrial
countries-including Germany (1968), Japan (1976), Switzerland (1977),
Sweden (1978), Italy (1978) and Spain (1992)-only relatively recently provided
for patent protection for pharmaceuticals and chemicals after developing their
own domestic industries. Ringo, supra note 119, at 123 n.14.




dragons""' (Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and
Singapore), reveals that recognition of IPRs is not essential
to development, despite the rhetoric of developed nations.
The experiences of these four countries demonstrate that
economic and political reform rather than legal protection of
IP may transform underdeveloped nations."9 Indeed, even
the development of the Western economies has arguably
had more to do with economic and political reform than pro-
tection of IP, although in the West recognition of IPRs has
certainly been a part of industrialization.1
Common economic concerns of developing nations relate
to costs associated with administration and enforcement of
IPRs, costs of increased royalty payments for use of foreign-
owned IP, costs of displacement of pirates, and costs of in-
creased need for research and development.2 1 1 Undoubtedly,
TRIPs will produce a rent transfer 12 from developing to
208. See generally EZRA F. VOGEL, THE FOUR LITTLE DRAGONS: THE SPREAD
of INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EAST ASIA (1992); BRIAN KELLY & MARK LONDON, THE
FOUR LrTLE DRAGONS (1990).
209. See VOGEL, supra note 208, at 83-91.
210. See SODIPO, supra note 2, at 81-82 (concluding that "[tlhough the
evidence that the technological progress made in industrialised economies was
derived from the intellectual property system is inconclusive, it still appears
logical to argue (in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary), that the
progress was at least partly influenced by the system").
211. See Carlos Primo Braga, The Developing Country Case For and Against
Intellectual Property Protection, in STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF
INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE
LITERATURE 69, 73-78 (Wolfgang E. Siebeck et al. eds., World Bank Discussion
Papers 1990); see also BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 155-56 (discussing various
theorists' assessments of direct, indirect and social costs of IP protection).
Machlup maintained in a review of the United States patent system that:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting one. But since we [the United States] have had
a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis
of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.
Id. at 156. One author offers eight generalized concerns of developing countries
regarding IP protection: 1) cultural attitudes regarding private property rights;
2) lack of perceived benefits; 3) underutilization of inventions; 4) availability of
essential commodities; 5) issues of autonomy; 6) lack of stimulus for local-
specific goods; 7) the effect of other factors such as legal and social structures;
and 8) the local political environment. Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South
Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 89, 122-24 (1993).
212. Rent transfer refers to money leaving one country and going to another
country. For example, IP protection would take money away from a local pirate
industry in a developing country and transfer it to a foreign owner of IP in a
developed country via licensing fees. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten
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developed nations in the short-term.213 Whether the long-
term potential benefits-new inventions, higher levels of
research and development, greater transfer of technology
and foreign direct investment214-outweigh the costs re-
mains to be seen.215 While there may be an aggregate bene-
fit to the world,216 we don't know if or how far that benefit
will extend to developing countries. We do know that IP
protection will have different economic implications depend-
ing on the preparedness of different nations.1 7 If for no
other reason, developing countries might consider protect-
ing IPRs simply because, so far, lack of protection has
generally failed to aid widespread development.
Fink, The Economic Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights:
Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, 72 CI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 442 (1996) ("If
the country.., has some production capabilities.., but limited innovative
capacity... higher standards of protection are likely to have negative welfare
impact, as local producers are displaced, prices rise, and a rent transfer from
local consumers and producers to foreign title-holders ensues."); Frederick
Abbott, The WTO TRIPs Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 385, 386 (1996) ("[If the IPRs to be protected were preponderantly
held by OECD country enterprises, then the recognition of IP ownership rights
would logically lead to a transfer of wealth from the developing to industrialized
economies, at least over the short-term."). From the perspective of developed
countries, piracy results in significant lost sales and revenues. See, e.g., Clinton
Orders U.S. Agencies to Crackdown on Software Piracy, 12 WORLD INTELL.
PROP. REP. 365 (1998) ("Gore estimated that software piracy in the United
States and abroad in 1997 accounted for $11 billion in lost sales to softvare
publishers.... Illegal copying of software by organization, businesses, and
government offices around the world is the single biggest source of lost sales for
software companies.").
213. See Braga & Fink, supra note 212, at 461. See generally Braga, supra
note 3, at 399-405 (discussing the economics of IPRs).
214. See Braga & Fink, The Economic Justification, supra note 212, at 446.
215. In calculating the costs and benefits of IP protection, it is imperative to
include lost opportunities in the equation. Free riding on someone else's
technical knowledge seems a quick way to make money and develop. However, a
system that allows free riding by not respecting IPRs must consider the lost
opportunities that adhere to piracy. First, much technology cannot be
appropriated-it is simply too difficult. Second, a free-rider strategy results in
lost opportunities to train local technicians and researchers, to attract venture
capital, and to promote universities dedicated to laboratory and market
research. Sherwood, supra note 62, at 75.
216. One assessment printed in the World Bank Discussion Papers
estimates that overall benefits from the Uruguay Round (that is benefits
including, but not limited to, TRIPs) are likely to generate gains of between $55
and $90 billion to developing countries and $100 to $200 billion dollars to the
world as a whole. See ThE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES at
xvii (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995).
217. See Braga & Fink, The Economic Justification, supra note 212, at 443.
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IV. TRIPs: A DEVELOPMENT ENHANCING STRATEGY
Despite the moral and economic objections of many
critics of TRIPs, developing nations nonetheless signed the
Agreement and were right to do so. Ironically, the com-
pelling argument denouncing IP as a human right suffers
from its own truth. There is no inherent ownership right to
IP.2 18 There certainly is not any universal experience to
point to a natural rights basis for IPRs. 19 They are
statutory rights-or rather 'privileges'-granted through
state intervention in the marketplace.22 Yet demonstrating
the weakness of characterizing IP as a human right
likewise diminishes the force of the right to development
argument. By electing to participate in GATT and speci-
fically in TRIPs developing nations make a conscious
economic choice.F21 While myriad political concerns may
influence that choice, the decision to comply with TRIPs is
not based on the West's imposition of the human rights
paradigm. The language of the human rights discourse in
the context of IP is but a proxy for economic policy, even if
sincere in its intentions. By successfully removing natural
rights from the argument, developing nations simul-
taneously relinquish the claim that their right to
development is frustrated by Western prescriptions of
natural rights. For the sake of clarity, if not honesty,
developed countries would do well to simply abandon their
high moral tone and address issues of IP as matters of
218. See GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 2, at v (stating that "the word
'right' may not be particularly well chosen").
219. Professor Oddi has argued this position most eloquently. See generally
A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPs-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic
Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).
220. See Raghavan, supra note 169, at 116.
221. In particular, many developing countries recognized, especially those
which attained independence from colonial powers, that international trade was
an important instrument to achieve economic growth. See Emmanuel Opoku
Awuku, How Do the Results of the Uruguay Round Affect the North-South
Trade?, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1994, at 75. In suggesting why developing
countries may have elected to participate in TRIPs, one commentator offered
the following remark:
While it may take a true believer to embrace a natural property rights
justification for the significant benefits offered under patent TRIPs to
patent owners in developed countries, nevertheless there may be other
justifications, in particular economic ones, that would lead the world
community, including developing countries and LDCs, to submit to
such a regime under GATT.
Oddi, supra note 219, at 440.
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domestic and international economic policy.222
Indeed, outside the ballyhooed rhetoric of politicians
and industry lobbyists, IP protection is generally recognized
as an economic, not a moral, issue."' The fact that an ever-
increasing percentage of international trade involves IP
corroborates this observation.224 The WTO is thus the
appropriate forum to address the international impacts of
IP.? 5 At another time IP may have more properly been left
to bilateral arrangements; however, today's truly global
economy and the paramount importance of technology and
information point to the strong link between trade and IP.
226
Even concerns about ideological imperialism and insen-
222. See CHIN & GROSSMAN, supra note 178, at 23.
223. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL
CONFLicT? 18 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988)
(describing a comprehensive study of IP protection in Argentina, Brazil, India,
Mexico, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan that found all of the
nations viewed I? as an economic issue). In the debate over the foundation for
the grant of intellectual property rights, the "natural rights justification of
intellectual property protection is very much subordinate to various economic
arguments." BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 151.
224. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE URUGUAY ROUND: GLOBAL
AGREEMENT-GLOBAL BENEFITS 24 (1994).
225. Some commentators have pointed to the fact that GATT's scant
attention to IPRs, prior to TRIPs, signals the insignificance of IP on trade flows
in the 1940's during the beginnings of GATT. While it was recognized that a
need existed to accommodate protection of IP in foreign nations, the Paris and
Berne Conventions and their many revisions seemed more appropriate than
GATT. See Braga, supra note 3, at 382.
226. GATT is an international system which fosters competition through
reducing barriers to trade. Property rights are an indispensable element of such
a system. The fact that intellectual property is increasingly an important part
of trade indicates the appropriateness of its inclusion in GATT. Nations which
elect participation in GATT thus implicitly recognize the property value of
knowledge-based goods. Therefore, inclusion of IPRs in GATT is consistent with
the underlying philosophy of free trade. See generally Fritz Franzmeyer, The
Consequences of the Uruguay Round for the OECD Countries, in WORLD TRADE
AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 52, 63 (Harald Sander & Andrds Inotai eds., 1996).
One of the negotiation objectives of the TRIPs Agreement during the Uruguay
Round specifically identifies the relationship between trade and IP:
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall
aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules
and disciplines.
Braga, supra note 3, at 385 (quoting and discussing the 1985 Ministerial
Declaration of Punta del Este).
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sitivity to cultural differences are less than compelling
today given the global movement towards market econ-
omies and free trade.227 This shift is consistent with inclu-
sion of IP in trade negotiations. The fact that most nations
have actively selected this course makes it difficult to point
a finger at the West for stamping out indigenous beliefs or
alternate notions of property. Local governments are
complicit. They have accepted the market paradigm, for
better or for worse, of which IP is an increasingly important
component. Indeed, one author who contends that "the
culture and heritage of developing countries [are] on a
collision course with the global consumer culture of the
more powerful developed countries," nonetheless urges that
227. For example while I was living in Belize between 1990-1995,
indigenous Maya Indians became embroiled in a battle with the Government of
Belize over ownership rights to ancestral lands. The Belize government had
granted logging concessions to foreign entities on Mayan ancestral land and
planned to pave a road providing greater access to the area. Right or wrong,
these were decisions of a local government to increase productivity and access to
resources so as to stimulate economic growth and development. They were not
decisions of the United States or the European Community to culturally
imperialize the Maya. The same can be said of the decision of local governments
to provide protection of intellectual property. For a discussion of the Maya land
claim, see generally Abid Aslam, Rights: Belizean Mayans Press Land Claims
Despite IDB Loan, INTER PRESS SERV., Jan. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL
5985272; Timothy M. Ito & Margaret Loftus, Cutting and Dealing Asian
Loggers Target the World's Remaining Rain Forests, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 39; Mary Jo McConahay, Letter From Belize: Loggers and
Activists in Rainforest Crunch, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1997, at G4; Mary Jo
McConahay, Rainforest Logging Disrupts Deep Cultural Rhythms in Tiny
Belize, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 27, 1996, at 10; Yvette Collymore,
Environmental-Belize: Maya Try to Fend off Malaysian Timber Barons, INTER
PRESS SERv., Dec. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 14476682; Oliver Tickell,
British-Funded Road Will Destroy Forest: Commercial Development Threatens
Mayan Lands, GUARDIAN, Dec. 2, 1996, at 11; Abid Aslam, Environmental-
Belize: Indigenous People Question Highway Project, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 7,
1996, available in 1996 WL 13588991; Randy Lee Loftis, Protecting Their Roots:
Mayan Villagers Fight to Save Belize Forests From Logging, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 15, 1996, at 1A. For a contrary position arguing that TRIPs
promotes imperialism, see Oddi, supra note 219, at 470 (concluding that TRIPs
"may not amount to 'gun boat' diplomacy, but it does smack of economic
imperialism against uppity 'pirate' states who deign to compete by 'imitation,'
which, if not 'the very lifeblood of a competetive economy,' is at least an aspect
of economic completion") (citations omitted). See also Marci A. Hamilton, The
TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996). Professor Hamilton boldly argues: "If TRIPs is
successful across the breathtaking sweep of signatory countries, it will be one of
the most effective vehicles of Western imperialism in history... [TRIPs]
imposes presuppositions about human value, effort and reward." Id. at 614-16.
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an IP regime can and should be used as a "cultural shield"
to protect native and indigenous culture."8 Sound devel-
opment strategies must therefore recognize local and for-
eign IPRs. In this context IP concerns cannot and should
not escape the auspices of the WTO, as the fortunes of the
developing countries and the world trading system are
closely intertwined.229
Developing countries ultimately accepted the TRIPs
Agreement in a bargained-for exchange which included
concessions on agricultural export subsidies by the
European Community, increased market access for tropical
products, generous transitional arrangements, and protec-
tion against unilateral measures primarily by the United
States and other powerful, Western industrialized na-
tions.' ° Certainly the dispute resolution procedures of the
WTO make developing countries less vulnerable to bilateral
confrontation with the United States and the European
Community.23' Moreover, developing nations also realized
that IP protection is increasingly important in order to212
attract multinational capital and investment. For certain
large developing countries, such as India and Brazil, it is
likely that they recognized IP protection was in their own
best interests in benefiting local inventors. Some analysts
have found that in newly industrializing economies,
recognition of IPRs correlates with the level of economic
development. That is, once a country reaches a certain
"development threshold," then protection of IPRs will
228. See Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on
Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COMP. REG. 229, 279-80 (1998) ("[D]eveloping countries can craft a protection
regime that would provide protection for such critical cultural elements as
folklore, ritual, costumes, and folk medicines."); see also Christine Haight
Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the
Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 54-57 (1997) (concluding that the existing
intellectual property regime is well-suited to protect groups who want to
participate in and control the marketing of their goods, but is deficient for those
who wish to preclude use of their imagery).
229. See Masood Ahmed, Forward to THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES at vi (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995).
230. Frederick M. Abbott, Commentary: The International Intellectual
Property Order Enters the 21st Century, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 472
(1996).
231. See Bronckers, supra note 61, at 1275; see also supra notes 128-30 and
accompanying text.
232. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Comment, in THE NEW GATT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 180, at 113.
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generate economic activity sufficient for the political struc-
ture to favor innovation over imitation.233
The result of increased global IP protection is a balance
of gains and concessions. While the effect of protecting
foreign IP will likely increase the short-term cost of
knowledge-intensive goods to developing countries as im-
porters, this loss is set against concessions on important
exports, such as textiles and agriculture, from developing
nations." Additionally developing countries will benefit
from the advantages of a multilateral agreement over the
likely stricter consequences of unilateral accords.2"5 At a
minimum, for developing countries inclusion of IP protec-
tion into GATT was a lesser evil than assured pressure and
likely sanctions from developed-world trading partners.3 6
233. See generally Christopher Stevens, The Consequences of the Uruguay
Round for Developing Countries, in WORLD TRADE AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND
71, 73 (Harald Sander & Andrds Inotai eds., 1996); India Amends Patent Law to
Give Effect to TRIPs, 9 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 42 (1995); Otto B. Licks,
Court, Attorney General Uphold Self-Execution of TRIPs Accord, 11 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 299 (1997). External pressure from developed nations to
recognize IPRs is often intensified towards newly industrializing countries.
Examples of areas commonly referred to as newly industrializing economies
include Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan. See Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Newly Industrializing
Economies, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 2, at 169, 172. But note that
India and Brazil were initially among the most vocal nations to oppose inclusion
of IPRs in GATT rather than WIPO. See Braga, supra note 3, at 384. Indian
Industry Minister Sikander Bakht remarked on India's protection of IPRs:
It is our firm belief that with this step India would integrate itself with
the world community in respect to intellectual property and provide the
necessary opening to its scientists and inventors. This would also help
to boost our exports and build up the necessary documentation of
scientific information.... We would now like the scientific and re-
search community to make use of this opportunity to seek global
protection for their inventions.
India Announces Intent to Accept WTO Ruling on Patent Protection, 12 WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 357 (1998). But some critics suggest that India still has a
long way to go to meeting international standards. See Sudhir Ahuja, IP
Treaties Show Little Effect in India, IP WORLDWIDE, Jan.fFeb. 1999, at 21,
available in <http://www.ipww.com/jan99/p2lip.html> (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
234. See Stevens, supra note 233, at 73.
235. See id.
236. See Bhagwati, supra note 232, at 113. In 1988 the Trade Act of 1974
was amended to require the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to
identify "priority foreign countries" which deny "adequate and effective"
intellectual property rights and which are "not making significant progress" to
eliminate the problem. See 19 U.S.C. 2242 (1994). The USTR has the power to
retaliate against "unfair" trade practices. If the USTR determines that "an act,
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Ultimately, recognition and protection of IPRs is
important not simply because Madonna or Nike or
Microsoft has a "right" to stop international piracy and
copying of their intellectual property. More importantly,
there are compelling arguments that IP protection will
indeed benefit the developing world in the long-run-par-
ticularly in creating incentives for domestic and foreign
researchers and entrepreneurs to invest resources in
innovative technologies and solutions to problems indig-
237enous to their countries.
policy, or practice of a foreign country violates, or is inconsistent with, the
provisions of, or otherwise denies to the United States under, any trade
agreement, or is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce"
he or she is authorized to "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of,
benefits of trade agreement concessions" with the infringing foreign country or
to "impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods" or services of-the
foreign country. Id. § 2411. This provision is known as "Special 301." The year
prior to the amendment of TRIPs into GATT, the U.S. Congress discussed the
importance of retaliation against IP infringement. See Special 301 and the
Fight Against Trade Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong. 103-56 (1993). The dispute
provisions in the TRIPs Agreement provide an additional buffer of protection for
developing countries against such unilateral retaliation. For an overview of the
most recent finding of the USTR pursuant to Special 301, see Results of U.S.
Trade Representative's 1998 Review of 'Special 301' Provisions of Trade Act of
1974 Regarding Intellectual Property Protection, Released May 1, 1998, 12
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 195 (1998). See also JACKSON, supra note 65, at 815-
43 (providing an overview of Section 301); BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 4-6
(explaining U.S. trade legislation as relates to intellectual property and noting
the questionable legality of Special 301 within GATT).
237. See Price, supra note 177. Some surveys indicate patent applications,
for example, soared in developing countries that adopted or reformed IP laws to
meet international standards. After the June 1991 reform of patent laws in
Mexico, large numbers of Mexican nationals filed patent applications. Similarly
in Columbia, copyright protection was extended to include computer software in
1989. Numerous Colombian nationals then produced and registered application
software packages. Contrast this with the technical team for the national coffee
growers cooperative in Columbia which is unwilling to pursue research because
of the lack of protection for biotechnology. In a study by the Brazilian
government, many corporations indicated that lack of IP protection reduced
their willingness to conduct research and development. The government found
that most of those favoring weak protection in Brazil are not involved in
research fields. See Sherwood, supra note 62, at 72, 77, 83; see also Robert M.
Sherwood, The TRIPs Agreement: Implications for Developing Countries, 37
IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 491, 525-27 (1997) (discussing factors affecting the trend in
patent applications in Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Mexico and South Korea during the
period from 1983 to 1993); BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 153-54 (providing a
general discussion of the numerous studies that have been conducted in
developed nations to determine the extent to which the rate of development and
commercialization of inventions would decline absent IP protection).
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The impact of IP on diverse fields ranging from scien-
tific research to creative authorship to commercial devel-
opment highlights its pervasive importance to industrial
progress. Furthermore, protection of IP in developing
nations will reduce the "brain drain" of talented individuals
who leave poor countries in order to make a better living
elsewhere.2"8 Recognition of IPRs will make it possible for
these professionals to profit from their creativity and
inventiveness in their home country.
We must disabuse ourselves of the image that all tech-
nology comes from developed countries. Incremental inno-
vation rather than media-hyped technological "break-
throughs" can be of immense value to a developing nation.239
Developing nations recognized this potential in signing on
238. See Price, supra note 177. Scientists and engineers in developing
nations commonly look to their former colonial parent for their technical
education-which often inculcates skills that are inapt for the developing
countries needs. Thus these professionals seek work in developed countries that
can utilize their skills, and whatever technical assistance may flow down to the
developing nation is outweighed by the exodus of indigenous talent and
intellectual skill. See BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 166.
239. See Sherwood, supra note 62, at 72.
Local researchers in developing countries can contribute to adaptation
and improvement of the local technological base. Inglorious, incremen-
tal work can have a cumulative impact. It is useful to get away from
thinking predominantly of headline-grabbing technology. In the devel-
oping countries, it is a loss when the humble farm worker who might
have designed a better plow is not stimulated to do so.
Id. at 83. Some authors argue that recognition of IPRs by developing countries
would allow developing countries to legally protect their endowment of natural
resources from unlawful exploitation. Nevertheless, critics of this position
maintain that providing for patenting of seeds and plants, for example, might
benefit multinational corporations more than unprepared industries in
developing countries, thereby preventing their use by local inhabitants and
inflating prices for drugs which originally come from the developing world. See
Awuku, supra note 221, at 84-85.
Notably international agencies are participating in relating strategies for
technological transformation to developing countries. Common recommenda-
tions from agencies such as UNCTAD and WIPO include: developing national
technology policies and national technology centers; providing incentives for
technological development through tax policies, direct financial assistance and
the establishment of national research institutes; encouraging greater
technological "collective self-reliance" and "collective self-sufficiency" among
developing countries; and exercising greater control over transnational
corporations located in developing countries to adapt their research to address
the technological needs and priorities of their host countries. See BLAKENEY,
supra note 15, at 171-77. One such IP training center was recently opened in
Malaysia. See IP Training Centre Launched in Malaysia, 12 WORLD INTELL.
PROP. REP. 184 (1998).
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to TRIPs. IP protection is not a singular prescription for
development but it is one important aspect to a develop-
ment plan.243 Although the origins of IPRs may hearken
back to a brute egoist carving out exclusive proprietorship
of ideas, utilized appropriately they can and often have
transcended their raw foundation to advance economic de-
velopment.
CONCLUSION
The TRIPs Agreement reglobalizes IPRs by tying
intellectual property to trade via the WTO. This revolu-
tionary linkage has altered the legal balkanization of IP
over the last one hundred years.24' IPRs are now visible and
enforceable in the international arena. They have assumed
a prominent role in trade negotiations. Nations that hope to
benefit from GATT's trade regime must respect interna-
tional IPRs. While some fear that TRIPs will further divide
the rich from the poor, developing countries were wise to
recognize the long-term potential of IP to stimulate domes-
tic creativity and attract foreign investment, thereby aiding
national economic development. Previous efforts to achieve
a worldwide system to recognize and protect IP were ham-
pered by limited participation of developing countries and
lack of enforcement provisions. TRIPs radically alters this
picture by holding all WTO member nations to a core of
established IP norms.242 Although the long-term effects of
TRIPs cannot be conclusively gauged for years, initial
evidence indicates that nations around the world are
responding to its provisions. This important and overdue
240. As Blakeney notes, "Although it is undeniable that technological
growth may be a catalyst for economic development, it is not the sole
determinant of that growth." BLAKENEY, supra note 15, at 160. Blakeney
provides a critical overview of what he titles "the rhetoric of development" as it
relates to technology transfer. Id. at 157-66. Yet despite clear costs and
challenges to developing countries, "seen over the longer term the positive
effects of technology transfer can be identified. Industrialisation has been
occurring in developing countries, sometimes at spectacular rates. One effect of
this has been that developing countries are enjoying an increasing share of
world trade." Id. at 162.
241. See generally Braga, supra note 3, at 381 ("TRIPs is the most
comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property rights ....").
242. See J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global




marriage of trade and IPRs243 is beginning and will continue
to raise competitive conditions that will benefit both
developed and developing countries through increased
innovation and investment.
243. See Sherwood, The TRIPs Agreement, supra note 237, at 493 ("[Tjhe
issue of intellectual property protection has been 'married' to international
trade.").
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